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Preface 
 
Humans and whales have shared the same planet for approximately two 
hundred thousand years. Yet despite our lengthy and at times tenuous 
cohabitation, fewer than one millionth of one percent of the human population 
will ever experience contact with whales in such an intimate and transformative 
way – in their natural habitats and on their own terms. Our estrangement with 
nature will lead to the demise of many whale species - “out of sight, out of 
mind”, as the saying goes (Austin 2013:12). 
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Introduction 
 
For as long as human beings have walked the Earth, they have lived in 
relationship with each other. And where there are relationships there is ethics. 
Ethics concerning how one ought to live and act in relation to other humans is 
deeply grounded in our society. It is practiced as a discipline all over the world 
across religions and cultures, it is taught in schools, and to use the field of 
ethics as a platform for arguments in a discussion is accepted as a central part 
of public debates. People often speak of ethical dilemmas, or ethically difficult 
choices, and ethics is an integrated part of the thought process when people 
choose how to live and act - it is not only practiced as an academic discipline. 
Virtually all humans agree that ethics is highly important. But other human 
beings are not the only ones we humans live in relationship with. We also live 
in relationship with the rest of nature - with other animals, plants, and non-
living natural entities such as rivers and mountains. From individuals to 
species and ecosystems – they are all a part of our human lives. However, 
ethics concerning how one ought to live and act in relation to more-than-
human nature is not so widely practiced as a discipline. It is seldom taught in 
schools and, as we will see, when people consciously use ecological ethics as 
a platform for discussion they are not always taken seriously. Ecological 
ethics then, as opposed to tradition human ethics is not an integrated part of 
the thought process when deciding how to live and act in relation to nature. 
The question remains, since human ethics is such an important part of our 
everyday lives because we live in relationship with other humans, should not 
ecological ethics also be important because we live in relationship with more-
than-human nature?  
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This thesis will address the debate concerning Norwegian whaling in an 
attempt to critically investigate the role of ecological ethics in a debate 
involving non-humans. Furthermore it will look at why ecological ethics 
seldom is consciously used as a platform for discussion, even though the issue 
discussed involves non-humans. After a general introduction to ethics, part 
one of the thesis will present an overview of ecological ethics by presenting 
some of the main views and discussions in this field, in addition to discussing 
the necessity of ecological ethics. Part two includes four chapters. The first 
chapter is a brief history of Norwegian whaling, the second is about minke 
whales (which is the species of whale that is commercially hunted in Norway) 
and the third presents “Vågehvalen – valgets kval”, a book published with 
support from the Norwegian government in 1993, and three of the arguments 
it presents for continuing whaling. It also discusses why these arguments are 
relevant to use when discussing whaling today. The fourth, and main, chapter 
in part two uses ecological ethics to discuss these three central arguments 
presented in “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” that support continuing whaling. It 
will also be discussed why, according to the book, those who argue in the light 
of ecological ethics have a ”legitimisation” problem, and why they often are 
not taken seriously in the debate. In the end some concluding thoughts will 
presented. 
 
Limitations 
 
Ecological ethics is an immensely vast field, and this thesis cannot nearly 
cover every aspect of it. There are countless views and approaches, critiques 
of these views and approaches, and even critiques of these critiques. I have 
chosen to present an overview of some of the different ecological ethicists in 
some detail, representing views from both ends of the scale and some in 
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between, instead of trying to cover as much as possible or only a limited 
number of them in more detail.  
 
The debate about Norwegian whaling, like the field of ecological ethics, is 
also too comprehensive for me to cover every aspect of it in this thesis. I have 
therefore chosen to discuss what I argue are the three main arguments 
“Vågehvalen – valgets kval” presents. There are also other arguments in the 
book that needs a more thorough discussion, but these will not be dealt with in 
this thesis. An example is the cultural aspects of whaling in small coastal 
communities. It is also worth mentioning that whaling is, obviously, not the 
only thing harming and killing whales. They are heavily affected by climate 
changes, heavy boat traffic, plastic and fishing gear in the ocean and seismic 
search for oil and gas. However, these are all human-made threats, and to 
discuss one of them in the light of ecological ethics should hopefully lead to 
discussions of the other issues as well. In my opinion, whaling is a good place 
to start this discussion because in contrast to the other influences it is a 
relatively straight forward matter.  
 
The goal of this thesis is not to cover every aspect of ecological ethics, 
everything that threatens whales or even every aspect of the whaling debate. 
Neither is the goal to come to any conclusions as to what ethics to “follow”, or 
whether Norwegian whaling is morally right. The goal is rather to present 
ecological ethics as a field, in an attempt to make more people familiar with it. 
I will be using the debate about whaling as an illustration of how different a 
discussion regarding non-humans could be if one acknowledges the need for 
ecological ethics and consciously use the field as a platform when discussing 
these matters. Hopefully it will inspire more people to reflect upon their 
relationship with the rest of nature, and encourage them to bring these 
thoughts with them when issues regarding non-humans are discussed in the 
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public. It is meant as an introduction and as a starting point, presenting 
different thoughts which the readers then may individually develop further. 
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Part One – Ecological Ethics 
 
Part one consists of three chapters. First a short introduction to ethics, second 
a chapter concerning the need for ecological ethics, and finally an overview of 
some of the central approaches and discussions in ecological ethics. It is 
concluded with a short summary.  
 
What is Ethics? 
 
The philosophical discipline of ethics has been practiced in the West during 
the last 2500 years (Light and Rolston III 2003:3). The word ethics comes 
from the Greek word “ethos” which means “custom”, but it now refers “not to 
how people actually do behave in their dealings with each other, but to how 
they ought to live and act” (Curry 2011:28). But how people think they ought 
to live and act are of course often reflected in the ways they do behave. Ethics 
is thus fundamental for how people chose to behave in relation to each other. 
In this chapter I will introduce ethics as a discipline, and present what, 
according to Curry (2011), are the three main approaches to ethics. It will be a 
rather brief presentation, with the purpose to introduce the field of ethics 
before introducing ecological ethics.  
 
Ethics asks questions about how one should live in relation with others. 
Typical ethical questions can be whether or not we should lie in a given 
situation, whether we should be charitable to those less fortunate than 
ourselves or whether those who have taken a human life should be punished 
by having their own life taken. “Ethics extends to all our duties and 
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obligations, virtues and vices, as we interact with each other” (Light and 
Rolston III 2003:3). Curry argues that the fundamental ethical question was 
asked by Socrates about 2500 years ago: “How should one best live, or what 
should one best do?” (Curry 2011:28). There are different approaches of how 
best to meet these important questions. According to Curry it is possible speak 
of three main approaches to ethics in philosophy: deontology, 
consequentialism and virtue ethics. I want to emphasise that this is only an 
example on how to categorise ethics, and that there are many different 
approaches and opinions on how it should be done. For instance, Light and 
Rolston III divide ethics into six parts: the general study of goodness, the 
general study of right action, applied ethics, metaethics, moral psychology and 
metaphysics of moral responsibility (the study of free will) (Light and Rolston 
III 2003:3). However, I have chosen Curry's presentation because it gives a 
simple and brief overview of the main approaches, and in the following 
sections his categories will be presented in more detail. 
 
The first approach is deontology, or rights, which was founded by Immanuel 
Kant. Kant was determined to come up with a rational definition of ethics, 
whose principles should be categorical (unconditional and binding for any 
rational being) as well as universal (applied without any exception). Rights 
and duties are inseparable, Kant says, because one persons right to be treated 
the right way is another persons duty to treat him or her the right way, and 
vice versa. It is these rights and duties that are the focus of deontology, and 
actions fulfilling duty are morally right regardless of their consequences. In 
Kant's deontology individual humans are seen as the only rational beings, and 
therefore only they are morally considerable. Hence rights and duties apply 
only to them. However, some, like Tom Regan, have extended deontology to 
include other animals, while some, such as Paul Taylor, also includes plants 
(Curry 2011:39-42).  
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The second category is consequentialism, or effects, founded by Jeremy 
Bentham and developed further by John Stuart Mill. Here, in contrast to 
deontology, the value of an action is not the action itself, but the consequences 
of it. Happiness for the greatest number of people is seen as the goal, making 
the ethical question whether or not an action is “useful in advancing the 
general happiness of humanity” (Curry 2011:43). The principal school of 
consequentialism is utilitarianism, and utilitarianism can be either hedonistic 
(a general definition of happiness is applied) or based on preference. Another 
distinction from deontology is therefore the collectiveness of 
consequentialism. Here, social well-being trumps individual rights, and while 
individuals matter, it is only to contribute to the general happiness of 
humanity. Some, like Peter Singer, extends consequentialism to other animals, 
but he limits this to sentient beings, Curry says, because those are the only 
ones who can experience happiness (Curry 2011:43-45).  
 
While the first two approaches are relatively recent, developed a few centuries 
ago, the last approach derives from the ethics of Aristotle; virtue ethics. Here 
the central focus is on developing a virtuous character, “such that good or 
right actions result naturally from its dispositions” (Curry 2011:45). There are 
four classical virtues – temperance, justice, courage and wisdom. These 
characterise what Aristotle called “eudaimonia”, which can be translated into 
“happiness” or “well-being”. A virtuous person should know what is good or 
right, and spontaneously do it. Virtue ethics has been criticised for not offering 
any universal “rights” to follow, but according to virtue ethics what is right to 
do will vary in different situations. There is no universal one answer that 
covers everything. “Virtue ethical behaviour is not about knowing what, but 
know-how, and we learn that through the lived experience of finding ourselves 
in concrete situations of ethical challenge” Curry 2011:48). Although virtue 
ethics focus on individual characters, it is not individualistic like deontology, 
as “eudaimonia cannot be developed in isolation” and “a person who 
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embodies it will also promote it in relation to others” (Curry 2011:45-46). 
Curry claims that there is nothing in the theory of virtue ethics itself limiting 
who or what can be the object of virtuous behaviour, so it can also be 
extended to other animals as well as non-animal nature (Curry 2011:45.46). 
All of these three approaches can, as we have seen, be perceived in a way that 
could include more-than-human nature. Deontology can be extended to non-
humans, as can consequentialism and virtue ethics. Why then, is there a need 
for ecological ethics? 
 
Why is there a Need for Ecological Ethics? 
 
Although ethics is about how we ought to live and act, for most people, their 
ethical values are reflected in the ways they choose to behave. The same is the 
case with ecological ethics – how one thinks that people should behave in 
relation with the rest of nature, has a lot to say on how one actually does 
behave. However, if a person has never been introduced to ecological ethics, 
and for this reason has never really reflected upon their relationship with 
more-than-human nature, then that could indeed affect the way someone acts 
in relation to it. In this chapter I will try to illustrate why ecological ethics as a 
discipline is important, that is, why it is important to reflect upon how one best 
should live and act in relation with the rest of nature. 
 
Anthropocene - The Human Era 
 
Even though I, personally, would never characterise humans as superior to 
other entities present on Earth, it seems obvious that the human species has 
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gained quite a unique position on this planet. Never before have humans had 
such a great impact on the world around us, and we are now in the process of 
shaping and affecting the Earth to an unprecedented extent (Tønnessen 
2013:17). The human species, homo sapiens, has colonised practically all land 
areas except for Antarctica, and has brought with them (among other things) 
livestock, companion animals and food crops as well as parasites and other 
”blind passengers”. Human activity “has no doubt shaped the recent history 
not only of our species, but of our entire living planet” (Tønnessen 2010:101). 
As an example, humans are significantly altering the cycles of carbon, 
nitrogen, phosphorus, sulphur and water, and are likely the force behind the 
sixth major extinction in Earth history (Crutzen et al. 2011). These trends, 
Crutzen et al. argue, are strong evidence that humankind “now rivals some of 
the great forces of Nature in its impact on the functioning of the Earths 
system” (Crutzen et al. 2011:843). Humans have thus gained a very special 
position as a species, evident by their ability to alter the ways of nature, 
including everything from its ecosystems and its climate, to the lives of 
billions of individual non-human animals.  
 
Humans have such a profound impact on the Earth and its inhabitants that 
some scientists argue that, as a result, we have entered a new geological era. 
From finding ourselves in the geological era of Holocene since the last ice 
age, an increasing number of scientists are now speaking of a new era called 
Anthropocene – the era where humans constitute a geological force on a 
global level (Tønnessen 2013:17-18). The concept was first formally 
introduced by Paul Crutzen in the year 2000, but similar thoughts and terms 
were used more than a hundred years before that. Some examples of early 
works are “Man and Nature; or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human 
Action” by G.P. Marsh, written as early as 1864, and “Man as a Geological 
Agent” by R. L. Sherlock in 1922 (Crutzen et al. 2011). When environmental 
problems came into focus in the 1970's and 1980's, more and more scholars 
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were exploring the concept of a human-shaped geological era, although not 
using it in their works. In 1992 A. C. Revkin wrote in a book about global 
warming that “perhaps earth scientists of the future will name this new post-
Holocene period for its causative element – for us. We are entering an age that 
might someday be referred to as, say, the Anthrocene” (Crutzen et al. 
2011:843). Revkin was right. Eight years later Crutzen (adding two letters) 
formally introduced the concept of Anthropocene, and now it is a well-known 
term among earth scientists and others. But even though it has become more 
common to talk of the Anthropocene era, it is still a relatively informal term. 
However, there has been formed an Anthropocene Working Group as part of 
the Subcommission on Quaternaty Straigraphy whose job it is consider 
whether the term should be formally recognised as a new era in Earth's history 
(Crutzen et al. 2011:843). This makes it evident that there is a broad 
agreement that we are entering, or already have entered, a human-shaped era. 
Crutzen himself, together with the other authors of “The Anthropocene: 
conceptual and historical perspectives” writes that the term Anthropocene 
suggests that “the Earth is now moving out of its current geological epoch, 
called the Holocene” and that ”human activity is largely responsible for this 
exit from the Holocene, that is, that humankind has become a global 
geological force in its own right” (Crutzen et al. 2011:843). How did we get 
there? When did the Holocene end? 
 
In their article Crutzen et al. describe how human beings have affected the 
environment they live in for thousands of years, but that up to the industrial 
revolution the effects have been relatively modest, and only at a local level. 
Not everyone agrees with them. Some describe the wave of extinctions during 
the last ice age, where a large number of mammals on at least four continents 
went extinct, as the start of the Anthropocene. Others highlight agriculture, 
especially when humans started clearing forests and converting it to crop 
lands, and the development of irrigated rice cultivating about 8000 and 5000 
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years ago, as possible beginnings of the new era. However, it is not clear that 
humans were the only reason for the mass extinction or if it had a real global 
effect, nor if the agriculture at that time really had any impact on the 
environment on a global level (Crutzen et al. 2011:846-847). Crutzen et al. 
thus advocate that the Anthropocene only started when the human activities 
were evident on a global scale. The discovery and exploitation of fossil fuels 
was an important starting point for this, as “exploiting fossil fuels allowed 
humanity to undertake new activities and vastly expand and accelerate the 
existing activities” (Crutzen et al. 2011:848). It can be said then, according to 
Crutzen et al., that humans affecting the environment on a global level first 
became evident during the industrial revolution, and that therefore this is when 
the new era of Anthropocene started. During this period, from around 1750 to 
1850, the energy use rose sharply, and for the first time humans truly affected 
the global environment. Even though the Anthropocene can be said to have 
started during the industrial revolution, there is one more period that is 
important to mention, namely the last half of the twentieth century. By then, 
the mark left by human activities on the global environment had already 
exceeded the patterns of Holocene variability in several important ways, but 
this imprint sharply increased after the second world war. The change was so 
dramatic that the 1945 to 2000 period has been called the “Great 
Acceleration” (Crutzen et al. 2011:849). During this period of half a century, 
the human population grew from three to six billion people, there was a high 
urbanisation-rate and a high conversion-rate of natural ecosystems to human-
made landscapes. Economic activities grew by 15 times and the consumption 
of petroleum by 3.5 times, and from 1950 to 2000 the concentration of CO2 in 
the atmosphere rose from 311ppm to 369 ppm (Crutzen et al. 2011:849-852). 
Today humans account for roughly 0.5% of the total biomass of the earth, but 
are consuming directly or indirectly between 24 and 39% of the total net 
products of its terrestrial and aquatic photosynthetic energy, along with about 
50% of the accessible runoff of fresh water (Curry 2011:210). These examples 
illustrate the sharp rise in human activities during the last decades, that has 
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caused the Earth system to “clearly [have] moved outside the envelope of 
Holocene variability” (Crutzen et al. 2011:850). Curry's example shows how 
much “space” humans take up on Earth today. 
 
Exactly when the new era started is not as relevant as to acknowledge the fact 
that the human era is here. After acknowledging that we find ourselves in a 
human-shaped world, in the Anthropocene, where practically all others are 
affected by our human actions, a pause for reflection is due. Does our special 
position in nature somehow make us morally responsible towards the rest of 
it? If the fundamental ethical question is “how should one best live, or what 
should one best do”, is it not time that the rest of nature is added to this 
question, considering the impact humans have on it? Should we not question 
how one should best live and act in relation to the rest of nature before we 
decide how to act, which is in fact what we do when deciding how to act in 
relation with other humans? An ecological ethical framework does not exclude 
conventional ethics or make it redundant, but instead both become aspects of a 
more comprehensive ethical imagination. Humans live in relation with other 
humans as well as in relation with the rest of nature, and how we treat more-
than-human nature should therefore be reflected upon as a part of our ethical 
framework - even if the wrongs done to more-than-human nature is not global 
or if the number of individuals affected is not billion-fold, as characterised by 
the Anthropocene. Therefore, ecological ethics is always needed as long as 
humans find themselves living in relation with the rest of nature - just as 
conventional ethics always will be needed as long as humans live in relation 
with each other. However, I have chosen to present the concept of the 
Anthropocene for all those who never really have given much thought to 
ecological ethics or the importance of it. The Anthropocene era illustrates in 
quite an extreme way the special position (or “power” if preferred), humans 
have gained, and the fact that it under consideration to become the official 
name of a new geological era should highlight the importance of reflecting on 
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the way we use this position or power. When acknowledging the era of 
Anthropocene we can no longer isolate ourselves from the rest of nature, or 
refuse to deal with anything but our own species. We cannot pretend that we 
are not affecting others, and it must also be emphasised that this impact is 
experienced as negative by many of those we share the planet with. Our power 
is often used to exploit and to use other parts of nature for our own interests, 
leading, for example, to extinction of species, pollution of ecosystems, the 
suffering of non-human animals in captivity and climate change. Curry 
highlights this current (human-made) “ecocrisis” as a primary reason why 
ecological ethics is needed (Curry 2011:15). So even though living in relation 
with more-than-human nature should be enough to ethically reflect upon this 
relationship, knowing that we are affecting others on such a large scale should 
absolutely lead to questioning the ethical implications of such a way to 
behave.  
 
Is a New Ethics Needed? 
 
So far I have argued that ecological ethics is needed for reflecting upon how 
we should behave in relation with the rest of nature. But why is this “new” 
concept of ecological ethics needed? Is it not possible for conventional ethics 
to be used for this purpose? 
 
In his article “Is There A Need for a New, and Environmental, Ethic?” 
Richard Sylvan argues that the conventional approaches to Western ethics are 
inadequate when dealing with the question of how to live and act in relation to 
the rest of nature. “The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an 
environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the domination of man and he 
is free to deal with it as he pleases (…), whereas on an environmental ethic 
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man is not so free to do as he pleases” (Sylvan 1998:18). He emphasises that 
prevailing ethics does deal with human's relation to nature, but it only 
scratches the surface of the issue, and harming more-than-human nature is 
only seen as wrong if it somehow affects other humans. In the words of 
Sylvan, in conventional ethics man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, 
insofar as it does not affect others (Sylvan 1973/1998:17). “Others” here are 
mainly restricted to other human beings. He argues that we need to rethink the 
ground pillars of ethics, by asking questions like who has rights? Or what has 
value? The answers to these questions have traditionally been human beings. 
Ecological ethics challenges this view. Sylvan thus concludes: “A new ethic is 
wanted” (Sylvan 1998:19). It can be discussed whether humans are the only 
rational beings in deontology, whether consequentialism only can include 
sentient beings, or as Curry argues that there is no limit as to who or what can 
be the object of virtuous behaviour in virtue ethics. But when doing so, we are 
in fact entering the field of ecological ethics. Ecological ethics is challenging 
the view that only humans count in ethics, and the most important question is, 
perhaps, who or what has value other than humans? Curry argues, for 
example, that virtue ethics can be extended to more-than-human nature, and he 
calls this a green virtue ethics - but then it becomes necessary to discuss 
whether there is any ethically significant difference between humans and the 
rest of nature (Curry 2011:51). Asking a question like this is outside the field 
of conventional ethics, and Curry dedicates several chapters of his book 
“Ecological Ethics – An Introduction” to discuss value. By stating that “our 
ethics needs to change, because our behaviour, as influences by ethics, needs 
to change”, it seems as though Curry agrees with Sylvan – a new, and 
ecological, ethic is needed.  
 
Not everyone agree with Sylvan, though. As we will see in the next chapter, 
Bryan G. Norton does not think that a new ethics is needed at all, as he argues 
that more-than-human nature can be protected without giving it value in its 
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own, and thus there is no need to discuss who or what has value. An ethics 
based on anthropocentrism can also protect the environment, he says (Norton 
2013). But is not this discussion a part of ecological ethics? He does in fact 
discusses who or what has value in its own (in his case the answer is humans) 
and what this implies (for example that this does not mean that humans are 
free to do as they pleases with more-than-human nature). By doing so, has he 
not already left the field of conventional ethics and entered a new one? 
Perhaps Norton and I have different opinions on what constitutes ecological 
ethics. He may argue that in order for an ecological ethics to exists one has to 
state that more-than-human nature has value, while I would state that one only 
need to discuss the matter to enter the field of ecological ethics. And discuss 
it, Norton does. This is why Norton's view will be presented in the next 
chapter, which is an overview of some of the main discussions in ecological 
ethics. There we will see that his view can only take us so far in protecting 
more-than-human nature, as the only way of ensuring that something is given 
moral consideration is to give it a value on its own. However, whether Norton 
likes it or not, I would still argue that his views are part of “a new ethic” - a 
platform that opens up the opportunity to discuss who or what counts in ethics 
and what this has to say on how we should live and act in relation with more-
than-human nature.  
 
Ecological Ethics – An Overview 
 
Acknowledging that we are currently in the geological era of Anthropocene, 
or just the admitting the fact that we live in relationship with the rest of nature, 
should lead to acknowledging that ethical questions not only should concern 
how to live and act in relation to other human beings, but also how to live and 
act in relation to the rest of nature. We, as humans, have power over most 
other entities on Earth, and that should encourage reflection on how and in 
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what ways we should use this power, or if we should use it at all. As we have 
seen, conventional ethics does not offer a sufficient platform to discuss this, 
and therefore ecological ethics is needed.  
 
“Put at is simplest, ethics is the question of how one should best live and act” 
and ecological ethics is “the view that ethical questions can no longer be 
restricted to how to treat other human beings, or even other animals, but must 
embrace the entire natural world” (Curry 2011:1). Ecological ethics is a broad 
discipline, representing both the views of those who think more-than-human 
nature should be valued only as a means to human need and use of it, and 
those who find intrinsic value in literary everything – from the Earth itself to 
its non-living entities, ecosystems, species and every single individual 
organism. And of course everything in between. Even though the views of 
what we should value and in what ways we should value it differs a lot even 
within ecological ethics, what those discussing these matters have in common 
is the view that ethics should not just be about how humans live and act in 
relationship with each other – as a part of nature, both affected by it and 
affecting it, we also have to discuss our relationship with more-than-human 
nature.  In this chapter I will present an overview of ecological ethics – some 
of the main thoughts when reflecting upon our relationship with more-than-
human nature. However, as ecological ethics is a vast discipline of different 
thoughts including their criticisms, this overview can only mention a few 
views among many. It will mainly focus on value - what value we should give 
to more-than-human nature and what this implies - which I see as the most 
central questions in ecological ethics.  
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Value 
 
Who counts in ethics? “Who deserves moral recognition such that we can 
meaningfully claim that they have suffered a moral harm?” (Light and Rolston 
III 2003:5). The fundamental questions in ecological ethics are related to 
value. Why? When something has value it becomes morally considerable, 
hence it deserves moral recognition and our ethics should strive to serve their 
interests. The main question is of course who or what has value? And what 
kind of value? There is a distinct separation between those who give more-
than-human nature instrumental value and those who give it intrinsic value. 
Instrumental value is when someone or something has value as a means to 
something else. For example, a rainforest can have value because people call it 
their home, because we are dependent on it for keeping our climate stable or 
because we might find the cure for cancer among its plant species. Or, it can 
have value in its own, for its own sake. When someone or something is valued 
for their own sake, “without any reference to its usefulness in realising some 
other goal”, it has intrinsic value (Curry 2011:52-54). One can also chose to 
give some parts of more-than-human nature intrinsic value, for example non-
human animals, or even just a few chosen species like mammals or those 
species we call companion animals, like dogs and cats. If one gives intrinsic 
value to, say, only mammals, then they are valued for their own sake, but the 
environment they live in is only valued as a means to sustain these animals. As 
an example, panda bears would be be given intrinsic value, and so humans 
would strive to give the panda bears the best kind of lives. That implies for 
example making sure there is enough bamboo for them to eat and enough 
space for them to live in, and so their natural habitat including its bamboo 
plants would be given value, but only an instrumental one.  
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Must something have intrinsic value to be morally considerable? Not 
necessarily at all times. As an example, the parents of a family can feel that 
they are morally obligated to treat the family's cat in a good way because the 
cat means a lot to their children, not because they give it intrinsic value. But 
what happens if the children get tired of the cat and do not wish to keep it 
anymore? Then the cat is no longer a moral consideration for the parents, who 
perhaps did not want a cat in the first place. Soon the cat might end up in a 
rescue shelter or on the streets. Another example is a waterfall valued by 
humans, not intrinsically but because they enjoy watching its beauty, use it as 
a hiking destination, etc. As long as watching this beauty is humans' top 
priority the waterfall will remain protected. However, if more electricity is 
needed, soon the waterfall might end up in pipes, as electricity and the 
comfortable lifestyle it provides usually are valued over the beauty of a 
waterfall. As with the example with the cat, human priorities, preferences and 
believes can always change. If the cat or the waterfall were valued 
intrinsically, then the human preferences would have had no impact. To be 
sure that something is morally considerable then, independent of human views 
over time, one has to value it intrinsically. This is why value is so important in 
ecological ethics. 
 
Different views on what has intrinsic value will be discussed in the next 
chapters. But first it is also of interest to discuss who can value. Rolston III 
discusses this in his chapter “Value in Nature and the Nature of Value”. He 
asks if human beings are the only ones who can value something intrinsically, 
and whether something can have value without humans giving it to it. Bryan 
G. Norton has said that valuing always occurs from the viewpoint of a 
conscious valuer (Rolston III 2003:143). This means that conscious animals 
are the only ones who are able to value, and that something cannot have value 
without someone from this group valuing it. Rolston III, on the other hand, 
does not agree. Did the Grand Canyon have no value before the arrival of 
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humans? Is there no value located independently in this spectacular natural 
phenomenon? When Norton argues that there can be no value without a 
valuer, Rolston III adds that there neither can be no science without a scientist 
or no religion without a believer. However, there can be physics without a 
physicists, stories without storytellers and history without historians – and he 
argues that there can also be value without valuers (Rolston III 2003:152). A 
sentient valuer is therefore not necessary. Rolston III also disagrees with 
Norton on the matter that only sentient beings are able to value. Like animals, 
plants are able to value their own existence intrinsically, by growing, 
reproducing, repairing wounds and resisting death. By being insentient, things 
may not matter to them, but they can matter for them. Species can also value 
themselves intrinsically, by the ability to reproduce. So can ecosystems, who 
are a matrix of interconnectedness between valuers. The Earth itself, Rolston 
III argues, also values by producing all earthbound values. “We commit the 
subjectivists fallacy if we think all values lie in subjective experiences, and, 
worse still, the anthropocentrist fallacy if we think all values lie in human 
options and preferences” (Rolston III 2003:146). Even though it might be the 
case that others than conscious animals also are able to value intrinsically and 
that value may exist without anyone giving it, this thesis will focus on what 
human beings choose to value, as humans most likely are the ones who are 
able to act freely on the basis of values, and it is human choices that affect the 
rest of nature the most. The question is then: what in nature do humans value? 
 
Anthropocentrism 
 
The view that more-than-human nature only has instrumental value is called 
anthropocentrism. This is a human-centred way of ethical thinking. Curry 
defines anthropocentrism as “the unjustified privileging of human beings, as 
such, at the expense of other forms of life, analogous to such prejudices as 
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racism or sexism” (Curry 2011:55). But why is anthropocentrism a part of 
ecological ethics, then? Having an anthropocentric world view does not 
necessarily mean that one does not care about anything other than human 
beings. It means that one may care because it is in human interest to do so. 
Curry calls this way of thinking a light green ethics (opposed to a dark green 
one), and Arne Næss calls it a shallow one (opposed to a deep one). Claire 
Palmer emphasises that anthropocentric approaches do not necessarily 
enchourage reckless exploitation of more-than-human nature, but “may 
instead maintain that natural resources should be very carefully managed for 
human benefit – including for the benefit of the poor and future human 
generations” (Palmer 2003:18).  
 
Norton is one of the ecological ethicists who argue for a light or shallow kind 
of ecological ethics. He says that the distinction between anthropocentrism 
and non-anthropocentrism, and hence instrumental and intrinsic value, has 
been given too much importance. Instead, he distinguishes between what he 
calls strong and weak anthropocentrism. To explain the difference between 
these, he introduces two concepts: “felt” and “considered” preferences. “A felt 
preference is any desire or need of a human individual that can at least 
temporarily be sated by some specifiable experience of that individual”, while 
a “considered preference is any desire or need that a human individual would 
express after careful deliberation, including a judgement that the desire or 
need is consistent with a rationally adopted world view”, where scientific 
theories, a metaphysical framework and moral ideals are included (Norton 
2003:164). Anthropocentrism is strong, Norton argues, if all value is explained 
by satisfaction of felt preferences of human individuals. It is weak, on the 
other hand, if the value is explained by some felt preferences or by considered 
preferences (Norton 2003:165). Norton then concludes that “within the limits 
set by weak anthropocentrism as here defined, there exists a framework for 
developing powerful reasons for protecting nature” (Norton 2003:165).  
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When distinguishing between strong and weak anthropocentrism, it can be 
argued that weak anthropocentrism is enough to treat more-than-human nature 
well, and this view is in fact the most common among those who call 
themselves environmentalists, including most environmental non-
governmental organisations and green political parties. Even though weak 
anthropocentrists may have the belief that they should protect more-than-
human nature, the only ones who are morally considerable are still human 
beings, and the reason for protecting it is thus human well-being. But if more-
than-human nature is treated well, does the reason why really matter? Norton 
uses an example with Hindus and Jains, who often keep from killing other 
animals, to illustrate that the reason why we treat more-than-human nature 
well does not matter. He emphasises that when Hindus and Jains restrain from 
killing insects, they “show concern for their own spiritual development rather 
than for the actual lives of those insects” (Norton 2003:165). I am quite sure 
that the insects who get to live do not care whether it was because the humans 
in question avoided doing it for their own sake or for the sake of the insects 
themselves. However, this argument can only take us so far. Far from every 
human being on Earth is concerned with his or her spiritual development, and 
as we saw in the example with the cat and the waterfall earlier, who humans 
think are morally considerable can always change if they have no intrinsic 
value. Using human well-being as the only motivation for moral consideration 
of more-than-human nature then, is unstable and uncertain, and it completely 
overlooks giving moral consideration to what has no effect on human well-
being. Because even though an act does not affect other humans or even future 
generation of humans, it may affect other beings. An example here is using 
other animals for food. It is well known among environmentalists that the 
modern livestock sector is one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in 
the world as well as one of the leading contributors to the loss of biodiversity. 
In developing countries it is also one of the leading sources of water pollution 
(FAO 2006:267). The livestock sector thus puts human well-being at risk, and 
the solution offered by a weak anthropocentric approach would most likely be 
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to find a way to produce meat and other animal products that do not destroy 
the environment. Options can be more small scale, locally and organically 
produced animal products, or even sustainable hunting of wild animals, 
including fishing. For a weak anthropocentrist, if the food is produced in a 
way that does not negatively influence human well-being, it does not matter 
whether these animals were killed or not, or perhaps even suffered during their 
lives. No humans will be harmed by this today or in the future. Using 
considered preference, informed by science, we know that non-human animals 
for example have the capacity to suffer the way humans do. But without 
giving intrinsic value to other animals, what kind of incentive will a weak 
anthropocentrist have to stop the suffering of a non-human animal? This is 
why many ecological ethicists argue that what has intrinsic value, or who is 
morally considerable, cannot be limited to human beings. The treatment of 
individual non-human animals, like those in the livestock industry, is often the 
first place to look when arguing that other natural entities than human beings 
have intrinsic value. As we shall see, other animals are usually the first ones 
who are welcomed inside human's moral circle. 
 
Expansion of the Moral Circle 
 
In conventional Western ethics, a line is drawn between human beings and the 
rest of the world. This line decides who has intrinsic value and hence who is 
(unconditionally) morally considerable. This circle can expand, however, to 
include others. It is a relatively new development that all human beings are 
considered to have intrinsic value. For example, not too long ago people who 
were put in the category “slaves” were only valued as working force, and not 
for their own sake. Today almost everyone agrees that all human beings have 
intrinsic value and that they belong inside the moral circle. This means that all 
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owe ethical obligations” (Light and Roleston III 2003:6). The United Nation's 
Universal Human Rights Declaration illustrates this. Now, picture every 
human being on Earth standing in a group with a circle drawn around them. 
The rest of the world is outside this circle. This is the world view of 
anthropocentrists. As we have seen, this does not necessarily imply that those 
who are outside the circle can be treated in whichever way, but that what they 
only have an instrumental value to those who are inside the circle. In 
ecological ethics, one starts to discuss if perhaps other natural entities than 
human beings have intrinsic value and should be included in this circle. In that 
case who does, and on what conditions? 
 
Where human beings draw their moral circle, is, of course, not any definitive 
answer to how the world really is or should be. It is the view of one among 
millions of species on the planet, not even shared by all individuals of that 
same species. As we have seen, some, like Rolston III, argues that all living 
organisms, and even species and ecosystems are able to value. If any other 
natural entities, say the squirrels or a pine tree, were to make their own moral 
circles I am sure it would look quite different, and I would guess that humans 
would no longer find themselves in the middle of the circle, but rather in the 
periphery. Who humans choose to include in their expanding circle is in no 
way universally right, and should therefore not be of great importance. Still, it 
is. Squirrels or pine trees are not in the unique position humans are, with 
power over most other entities in nature. In fact, no other species or natural 
entities are. Therefore, how humans construct their moral circle is important 
and influential for the rest of the planet, and for some - like ecosystems 
affected by oil spills or animals killed in experiments - it is vital. “We humans 
hold up the lamp that lights up value, although we require the fuel that nature 
provides” (Rolston III 2003:144). If we hold the lamp, then we also decide 
what should be in the light and what should remain in the dark. What to 
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include then, if the circle of moral considerability should expand and not just 
include our own species? What are the criteria for being included? 
 
The Moral Circle Expands 
 
The first ones to gain intrinsic value when the moral circle starts to expand are 
those who are most like ourselves, namely non-human animals. The capacity 
to feel pleasure and pain is for many a criterion to be included. Peter Singer 
states that if a being suffers, the fact that it is not a member of our own species 
cannot be a moral reason for not taking this suffering into account. He 
compares the white slaveowners' denial of the black slaves' interests on the 
basis of their “race” to humans' denial of other animals’ interests on the basis 
of their species. The white racists limited their moral concern to their own 
“race”, and thus the suffering of a black did not have the same moral 
significance as the suffering of a white. “We now recognize that in doing so 
they were making an arbitrary distinction, and that the existence of suffering, 
rather than the race of the sufferer, is what is really morally significant” 
(Singer 2003:57). If “species” is substituted with “race”, Singer argues, then 
the logic of racism and the logic of what he calls “speciesism” are 
indistinguishable, and if one wishes to reject racism then one must also reject 
speciesism (Singer 2003:57). Speciesism is a term first introduced by Richard 
D. Ryder in 1970, but it was made known by Singer in his book “Animal 
Liberation” from 1975. Like the example above shows, speciesism is 
discrimination on the basis of species, which is comparable to racism or 
sexism. In Singer's own words, speciesism “is prejudice or attitude on bias in 
favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of 
members of other species” (Singer 2009:6). For Singer, the criterion for being 
morally considerable is thus not which species one belongs to, but the capacity 
to feel pleasure and pain, or as he calls it, the capacity to have interests. 
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According to Singer, only a being with subjective experience, such as the 
experience of pleasure or the experience of pain, can have interests in the full 
sense of the term, and everyone with such experiences has at least one interest 
– the interest of experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain. “Thus 
consciousness, or the capacity for subjective experience, is both a necessary 
and a sufficient condition for having interests” (Singer 2003:57). Mammals 
and birds clearly have interests in Singer's term, as do other vertebrates. When 
it comes to some insects, crustaceans, mollusks etc. however, it becomes more 
uncertain. Singer draws no clear line here. If asked whether plants have 
interests Singer would say no. He compares a plant's interest to have enough 
water so that it can grow with a car's need to be taken care of if it is to run 
properly. If we do not give consciousness to plants, which basically no one 
does, then they do not have any interests, and therefore, according to Singer, 
“nonconscious life lacks intrinsic value” (Singer 2003:60) and consequently 
stands outside the moral circle. This also includes species and ecosystems. The 
treatment of non-animal nature is not insignificant, however, as treating their 
environment badly would affect the lives of sentient animals. Singer thus 
gives non-animal nature instrumental value.  
 
The fact that all sentient beings have intrinsic value in Singer's position does 
not mean that everyone should be treated the same way, as the interests of one 
being might be greater than those of another. Singer says that if one has to 
choose between saving, say, a human and a dog, then, according to this 
approach, the being with greater interests should be saved. Under most 
circumstances, Singer argues, the human should be saved, as a human is more 
aware of the situation than the dog and therefore would suffer more from 
being killed, as the human has a greater potential for future happiness, and, in 
addition, as the human most likely has friends and family who will suffer if 
the human dies. Here, the balance of interests favours the human, and it is this 
balance of interests that Singer argues should form the basis of decision 
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making. “This decision would be in accordance with the principle of equal 
consideration of interests, for the interests of the dog get the same 
consideration as the those of the human” (Singer 2003:58). The loss to the dog 
is not discounted for the reason that it is a member of another species then our 
own. This implies that in a different situation the outcome could be different. 
For example, “if the human were grossly mentally defective and without 
family or anyone else who would grieve for it, the balance of interests might 
favor the non-human” (Singer 2003:58). As we know, a dog may have many 
happy years to come, as well as friends and family, human or non-human, that 
would grieve its death. Singer's most important point is that the species a 
sentient being belongs to should not decide how it is treated, but rather its 
interests.  
 
A similar position is animal rights, fronted by Tom Regan. Those in favour of 
animal rights argue that individual human rights should be extended to include 
all animals. This view is very similar to Singer's animal liberation, and they 
share the same goal - liberation for all animals. However, Regan does not 
agree with Singer that the egalitarian interpretation of interests automatically 
leads to animal liberation. To illustrate this, he uses an example with human 
slaves. If one were to count the interests of the slaves and the slaveowners 
equally before deciding whether or not to end human slavery, there would be 
no guarantee that the slaves would be liberated, Regan says. Instead of first 
counting their interest to then see if they should be liberated, we should first 
recognise the moral imperative to liberate them. “The interests of those who 
profit from slavery should play no role whatsoever in deciding to abolish the 
institution from which they profit” (Regan 2003:69). Further he states that “It 
is the right of slaves to be free, their right not to be treated as another's 
property” and that “it is these basic moral rights that a system of chattle 
slavery systematically violates, not the principle that we must count equal 
interests equally” (Regan 2003:69). Regan says that what an animal rights 
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approach recognises is “the prima facie right of individuals not to be harmed, 
and thus the prima facie right of individuals not to be killed” (Regan 2003:71). 
Regan agrees with Singer that animal liberation is the goal, but advocates for 
the recognition of the rights of non-human animals not to be exploited by 
humans. He argues that this is a better way of understanding animal liberation 
than the way provided by an egalitarian interpretation of interests. “When 
viewed in this lights, Animal Liberation is the goal for which the philosophy 
of animal rights is the philosophy. The two – Animal Liberation and Animal 
Rights – go together, like a hand in glove” (Regan 2003:69). Singer and Regan 
also share the view that it is only individual beings who are morally 
considerable, and thus only individual sentient beings are entitled moral rights 
(Regan 2003:71). “All adult animals, at least, are self-aware, and they 
therefore have a right to live, including a certain quality of life” (Curry 
2011:74). This first expansive position, including individual non-human 
animals as morally considerable, is known either as pathocentrism, or as 
sentientism. 
 
The Moral Circle Continues to Expand 
 
Singer is not alone when arguing that having interests is the criterion for being 
welcomed inside the moral circle. However, not everyone agrees on what 
having interests implies. Gary Varner argues that having interests means that 
something “has a welfare or good of its own”, something he argues that all 
individual living things have (Palmer 2003:20). In his sense of the word 
interests then, sentient beings are not the only ones who have intrinsic value 
and should be inside the moral circle. However, even though Varner states that 
all individual living things have intrinsic value, he creates a hierarchy among 
them, based on desires. Those who have purely biological interests, such as a 
plant's interest for sunlight or water, do not have desires, while many animals, 
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such as mammals and birds, do. Among those who have interests, those who 
have long-term desires that require satisfaction across a lifetime, or what 
Varner calls ground projects, take priority over the others. He argues that with 
perhaps a few exceptions, humans are the only ones with ground projects. So 
even though non-animal living beings have interests, their purely biological 
interests must be put aside for human's ground projects, which for example 
must include eating. Most non-human animals do not have ground projects, 
but they do have desires. Therefore, humans should achieve their ground 
projects for example by eating non-desiring plants, which are lower than non-
human animals in Varner's hierarchy (Varner 2003:20-21). However, by 
having interests, plants also belongs inside the moral circle, and when their 
well-being do not stand in way for anyones ground projects or desires, they 
should be treated well. 
 
Far from every ecological ethicists agrees that having interests is the only 
criterion for being morally considerable. Robin Attfield for example, does not 
speak of interests as a prerequisite for being included into the moral circle, but 
instead of the ability to flourish – “to exercise the basic capacities of a 
species” (Palmer 2003:20). An organism with the ability to flourish will have 
the interest of doing so. According to Attfield, inanimate objects are the only 
ones who cannot flourish, an hence all living organisms are morally 
considerable. Like Varner, Attfield also creates a hierarchy among those who 
are morally considerable. He puts organisms with a higher psychological 
complexity over those with a lower one, and place humans at the top and 
plants at the bottom. He also puts basic and survival needs over preferences 
(Palmer 2003). But still, as with Varner's view, all living organisms, by the 
ability to flourish, belong inside the moral circle. 
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Jonathan Beever and Morten Tønnessen also argue that all living things should 
be morally considerable and hence included in the moral circle. They argue 
that “all living beings, even unicellular beings, have subjective experience by 
having semiotic agency, the capacity to navigate in a world of signs” (Beever 
and Tønnessen, forthcoming). Moral status should be attributed to all living 
beings, they argue, as they all have semiotic agency. This implies that “there is 
a world of experience that means something to each living creature”, and that 
“all living beings are capable of distinguishing between what is attractive to 
them, what is repulsive to them, and what has no function for them by means 
of relating to sign relationships” (Beever and Tønnessen, forthcoming). These 
positions are different versions of what is called biocentrism, where all 
individual living organisms are seen as morally relevant, but where other 
entities are not. 
 
The Moral Circle Expands even Further 
 
So far, every individual living organism on Earth has been welcomed into the 
moral circle. Some by being sentient, others by having interests, the ability to 
flourish or semiotic agency. Whether deontological; giving rights to non-
humans or even non-animals, or consequentialist; with the goal to achieve the 
best life for the highest number of beings, all these views are individualistic, 
concerning individual beings only. In addition, none of them include 
inanimate entities. But the world consists of more than living beings and 
individuals. What would the world be without mountains, oceans, rivers, 
beaches or winds? Without species and ecosystems? Is it even possible to 
think of individual living creatures outside the context of their relationships 
with other entities? 
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One prominent approach to ethics concerning the land as a whole is Aldo 
Leopold's “land ethic”, developed in the first half of the twentieth century. The 
land ethic concerns itself with human's relation to land, and emphasises that 
we humans should not, and cannot, control the land in our own favour. On the 
contrary, Leopold argues, we must recognise ourselves as a part of nature, not 
outside or above it. Leopold himself first became aware of this during an 
encounter with a dying wolf he had participated in killing. At that time he was 
a wolf hunter, thinking that “because fewer wolves meant more deer, that no 
wolves would mean hunters' paradise” (Leopold 1949:130). But after 
watching the “fierce green fire” dying in the wolf's eyes, he suddenly 
understood that this was not right. After that episode, he started to notice the 
consequences of killing the wolves - “I have seen every edible bush and 
seedling browsed, first to anaemic desuetude, and then to death (…) In the end 
the starved bones of the hoped-for deer herd, dead of its own too-much” 
(Leopold 1949:130-132). The complex interconnectedness of nature, as well 
as humans' role in it became clear to him, and he realised that there was no 
existing ethic dealing with this relationship between humans and the land. 
Leopold writes that ethics until his time had rested upon the premise that the 
individual is a member of a community, and that ethics can guide these 
individuals on how to live together or cooperate in this community. 
The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include 
soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land” (Leopold 2003:39). 
In short, he says, a land ethic “changes the role of Homo sapiens from 
conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies 
respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such 
(Leopold 2003:39).   
This implies that one have to value the land, he says. Not only economically, 
but in a “philosophical sense” (Leopold 2003:46). Or, one could put it, not 
only instrumentally, but intrinsically. The problem of only valuing the land 
economically is as relevant today as it was in Leopold's time. He noticed that 
everything about conservation of nature was for the sake of humans, and that 
economic incentives were central if conserving more-than-human nature. He 
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illustrates this with an example of disappearing songbirds in a particular area 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. The songbirds were starting to 
disappear, and the ornithologists became worried. The songbirds were 
valuable to them, but not in an economic sense. Therefore they had to come up 
with a reason for the government to save them. The reason had to be 
economic, or else very few would have bothered saving them. In the end, they 
told the government that if the songbirds disappeared, there would be so many 
insects left that they would “eat us up”, hence an anthropocentric reason for 
saving them. (Leopold 2003:41). In his land ethic, Leopold, the way I see it, 
makes two main points. The first point is that we must learn to understand the 
complex interconnectedness of nature, and start to see the land as the base of 
the pyramid of life (Leopold 2003:43). Everything is dependent on the land, 
including ourselves, and everything on the land is connected. Therefore it 
neither makes sense only to value individual organisms, nor to only value 
humans. Leopold's second main point is that this value must be, in his words, 
philosophical, not only economical. Many elements of the land community 
lack commercial value, he says, but are essential to the healthy functioning of 
it (Leopold 2003:42). Based on these two main points he developed an ethical 
statement, which says that “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
tends otherwise” (Leopold 2003:46). The land ethic thus values ecological 
communities as a whole This position is known as ecocentrism. and not just 
individuals, unlike the other ethics explored so far.  
 
J. Baird Callicott is another ecological ethicist who develops an ecocentric 
position. Callicott describes the effect upon ecological systems as “the 
decisive factor in the determination of the ethical quality of actions” (Katz 
2003:86). Thus the primary object of moral concern is the ecosystems, or as 
Leopold puts it, the biotic community. If ecosystems are included in the moral 
circle, and even the primary concern, how should we then treat individual 
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beings? If all individual organisms as well as ecosystems are morally 
considerable, will we not experience some conflicting views? Eric Katz 
reflects upon this. He asks if we can treat individuals however we like as long 
as it is in the interest of the ecosystem, or as long as it does not affect, in 
Leopold's words, the integrity, stability or beauty of the biotic community. 
This would imply, he says, that a flower of a threatened species is more 
important to save than a critically ill or harmed human being. A human dying 
has no negative effect on the ecosystem as a whole. In fact, judging by the 
way humans act in relation to more-than-human nature today, it may on the 
contrary have a rather positive effect because it would lessen the pressure 
human beings put on the rest of nature. Katz thus experiences difficulties to 
see why we should adopt this kind of ethics when it is rather clear that nature 
would be better off without humans in it (Katz 2003:86-87). If we want an 
ethic where humans are seen as a plain member of nature, like Leopold states, 
and at the same time does not demand the extinction of humans, then where 
should we draw the line for what humans can do that affects the rest of nature? 
Is it OK to clear a forest to provide housing? What about damming up a river 
to provide electricity? “The crucial point to remember is that this form of an 
environmental ethic claims that humans are no different than any other 
species; the measure of their worth and the worth of their activities is decided 
by the overall well-being of the natural community” (Katz 2003:87). It is 
perhaps easy to overlook the part where Leopold says that a land ethic also 
implies that humans respect their fellow-members of the community, and it 
may seem like Katz has done this mistake. Respecting other members does not 
only mean other humans, but also other individual beings. As Callicott puts it, 
the land ethic not only has an holistic aspect, “it is holistic with a vengeance” 
(Callicott 1998:109). And so, Leopold and Katz seem to agree after all that 
individuals cannot be treated with indifference. Leopold's land ethic was 
meant to supplement already existing ethics, not to take value away from 
humans or other individuals. However, Katz's concern for how one should live 
and act in accordance with a holistic ethic like the land ethic in practice, 
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remains. In which case is it OK to save an individual even though it is not in 
the best interest of the biotic community as a whole? And how comfortable 
can a human live before his or her impact on nature is unacceptable? These 
and similar questions is the reason why many ecological ethicists argue for 
some kind of hierarchy in nature, like Singer's focus on interests or Varner's 
focus on ground projects, as it is impossible to treat everything in the same 
way, as well as it is impossible to live without hurting anything. Even by 
walking and breathing we may technically harm others. For this reason Katz 
questions whether ecosystems should be the main concern for moral 
considerability after all, and if not, what should? “(...) is the unit of our 
concern the individual ant, the anthill, the family, the species, or the ant's 
habitat?” (Stone 2003:194). Katz discusses whether species should be our 
main concern then, but comes to the conclusion that a view like this would be 
difficult to defend:  
Either a species is important because it fulfils an ecological function in the 
natural community, in which case the community model of an environmental 
ethic will explain its preservation; or a species is important because the 
individual members of the species are valuable, in which case an individualistic 
model of an environmental ethic will explain the act of preservation (Katz 
2003:89).  
Species then, cannot be our primary concern. What about individuals? As 
discussed earlier, individuals can also include plants and other living 
organisms. But what about inanimate nature? What can moral consideration of 
non-living entities be based on? Only as a part of a community, Katz argues. 
And then we are back to ecosystems. On the basis of this discussion, Katz 
concludes that ecosystems are to be put first, and that individuals and species 
must be added as a secondary concern. The focus must be on both of these 
groups, as valuing ecosystems is the only way of including every entity, and 
because by only focusing on ecosystems, the treatment of individuals does not 
matter as long as it does not affect the well-being of an ecosystem. He 
therefore states that the overall good of the ecosystem is the primary concern, 
but that “this communal good should be supplemented by a consideration of 
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natural individuals and species, so that in cases where ecosystemic well-being 
is not an issue, the protection of endangered species or natural individuals can 
be morally justified” (Katz 2003:91).  
 
Not everyone agrees that we have to put anything first. Is really an ecosystem 
worth more than the species or individuals it consists of, animate or not? Or 
the other way around? Does it make any sense to value one entity more than 
another, or to exclude anything? David Abram, another ecocentric ethicist, 
disagrees with Katz that moral consideration of inanimate nature is difficult to 
defend, and argues that all entities have intrinsic value, including the non-
living and non-individual. His overlying argument is that there is an 
interconnectedness in nature, where the existence of one entity is made 
possible by the existence of other entities. As a part of nature, humans take 
part in this interconnectedness, or as he calls it, reciprocity. He argues for a 
moral recognition of all entities, on the basis that they all have a mind, or 
knowledge, on their own. Why, Abram asks, when it today is acknowledged 
that mind and body are two different aspects of the same thing, is mind 
exclusive to human beings? Or even to non-human animals? The earlier 
distinction between mind and body has changed course – now the distinction 
is between the sentient human (or animal) and the rest of nature which remain 
as objects, stripped of all intelligence. Abram says that because we, the human 
body and mind, are dependent on and shaped by nature, it does not make more 
sense to split them than it does to spilt the human mind and body. Our body 
and minds cannot be seen as isolated from nature, as our sentience emerges 
from our ongoing encounter with nature. “Do we really believe that human 
imagination can sustain itself without other shapes of sentience”? (Abram 
2010:128-129). With these arguments, Abram argues for an ecocentric 
approach to ethics, where all parts of nature are connected and sustain each 
other, and also each others' minds. “Not only does it [more-than-human 
nature] have intrinsic value (…), but agency, intention, emotion: attributes 
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which some arrogantly claim as solely human, but which result from, and are 
properties of, the entire web of life” (Curry 2011:2).  
 
Another ecocentric position is “deep ecology”, founded by the Norwegian 
philosopher Arne Næss. The term deep ecology was first mentioned in his 
paper “The Shallow and The Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements” from 
1972. Like Abram, Næss argues for an ethical approach where all natural 
entities are morally considerable. He states that all life on Earth, including the 
richness and diversity of life forms, have value in themselves, independent of 
the usefulness for humans. He also has the same strong focus on nature as a 
whole as Leopold and Abram. “Deep ecology thus strives to be non-
anthropocentric by viewing humans as just one constituency among others in 
the biotic community, just one particular strand in the web of life, just one 
kind of knot in the biospherical net” (Fox 2003:253). Deep ecology is both a 
philosophical and a socio-political activist movement, and according to 
Stephan Harding it is primarily the emphasis on action that distinguishes deep 
ecology from other ecocentric ethics (Harding 2006:50). It was first presented 
as a challenge to the anthropocentric way of discussing the environmental 
challenges, where all the arguments were human-centred. The central question 
was (and still is): how can we continue business-as-usual without running out 
of the resources we need to do so? Næss calls this a “shallow ecology”. By 
shallow ecology he means the view that it does not matter how more-than-
human nature is treated as long as it is of no threat to the well-being of 
humans. In other words, more-than-human nature matters, but not for its own 
sake. It only has instrumental value. Næss mentions the different views on use 
of natural resources as an example. The shallow ecological approach, he says, 
claims that the natural resources of the earth belong to those who have the 
technology to exploit them, i.e. to humans. Plants, non-human animals and 
natural objects are only valuable as resources for humans. Over-exploitation is 
not encouraged, but only because humans then would have to live without 
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those resources. “If no human use is known, or seems likely ever to be found, 
it does not matter if they are destroyed (Næss 1998:200). In deep ecology on 
the other hand, no natural object or life-form is conceived solely as a resource, 
and it is acknowledged that humans are not the only ones dependent on the 
natural resources. However, humans, like others, are dependent on using some 
resources. Deep ecology therefore encourages us to ask ourselves why we use 
resources and what we really need to live life fully, and to reflect upon our 
relationship with non-humans who also are in need of these resources. Næss 
argues that humans should only use resources to satisfy their vital needs. 
When non-vital needs conflict with the vital needs of non-humans, the humans 
should defer to the latter (Næss 1998:202). To ask questions like these, for 
example what resources we really need and why, instead of how we most 
effectively can use them to our benefit, is a central part of deep ecology and is 
called deep questioning. Together with deep experience and deep commitment 
it constitutes what Harding calls “the he three senses of deep” in deep ecology. 
Deep experience is a sense of “profound waking up”, a feeling of deep 
connection with more-than-human nature. Næss had this deep experience the 
first time he looked upon the mountain Hallingskarvet at the age of seven, and 
Leopold when he saw the fierce green fire die in the wolf's eyes. Having a 
deep experience with nature makes one react when it is treated badly. Deeper 
questions may then be asked - like why someone or something is treated this 
way, who benefits from it, and if it is really necessary. This again may lead to 
a deep commitment to act - to bring about change in peaceful and democratic 
ways. Business-as-usual, as mentioned earlier, is treated as an obvious goal, 
even at conferences discussing environmental challenges. But if we have a 
deep experience with more-than-human nature, and see the wrongs that is 
done to it by continuing with business-as-usual, we may start to ask deeper 
questions than how we best can continue the way we do. Those who advocate 
for business-as-usual, why do they want it? Does more money and more things 
make us happier? Are my non-vital needs more important than others' vital 
needs, human or non-human? After a deep question process like this, does the 
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statement about business-as-usual as the goal still stand? If it does not, what 
does this imply? At least it can be argued that it implies that what is presented 
as the goal, and thus the centre of discussion, in fact may not be the goal at all. 
Harding present these three senses of deep as interconnected, as each point is 
reinforced by the others (Harding 2006:50-52).  
 
 
Figure 1: “The Three Senses of Deep” (Harding 2006:51). 
 
Together with George Sessions, Næss developed an eight point platform, with 
key terms and phrases, proposed as a basic to deep ecology. Together with the 
three senses of deep, this eight point platform is seen as “the heart of deep 
ecology” (Sessions 1998:172-173). It states that:  
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have 
value in themselves (synonymous: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values 
are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these 
values and are also values in themselves. 
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy 
vital needs. 
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially 
smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires a smaller 
human population. 
	  38	  
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the 
situation is rapidly worsening. 
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, 
technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be 
deeply different from the present. 
7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life equality 
(dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly 
higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference 
between bigness and greatness. 
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or 
indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes  
(Næss 1998:196-197). 
Even though deep ecology can be seen as an ethic in itself, it is primarily 
developed as a tool, aiming to “help individuals to explore the ethical 
implications of their sense of profound connection to nature, and to ground 
these ethical insights in practical action in the service of genuine ecological 
sustainability” (Harding 2006:50). Næss' goal is thus not to present an ethic 
that everyone should follow, but to encourage others to use deep ecology as a 
tool for reflecting upon their relationship with more-than-human nature. In a 
way, it seems like his goal is to highlight the importance of ecological ethics 
and to engage more people in it.  
 
Ecocentric approaches may cause, as we have seen, some confusion as to how 
it is possible to live in accordance with these views. What if one does not wish 
to make a clear hierarchy in nature but still wants to take all of nature into 
moral consideration while still live a satisfactory human life? How is it 
possible to find an ethic that takes all these aspects into consideration? 
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Moral Pluralism 
 
Some ecological ethicists, like Christopher D. Stone, argues that finding an 
ethic like this is not possible. Instead, he looks to moral pluralism. “Moral 
pluralism is the view that our ethical life consists of a number of different 
principles or values which can conflict, and which cannot be boiled down to 
just one” (Curry 2011:150). When we face a variety of ethical dilemmas, 
regarding such different things as a lake, a spider, the Amazon forest or the 
species of blue whales, why should there be only one universal ethical 
framework, answering how one best should act in every situation? Is this even 
possible? Stone thinks not. He states that his own view “is that monism's 
ambitions, to unify all ethics within a single framework capable of yielding the 
one right answer to all quandaries, are simply quixotic” (Stone 2003:196). 
Stone does not think that an ecological ethicist's task is to put forward and 
defend a single overarching principle, but to use the different principles of 
ecological ethics to discuss the best solutions for different situations. Curry 
says that moral pluralism implies that different considerations can validly be 
applied in different cases, and each case can be properly viewed in different 
ways. “And those taking the decisions must therefore take responsibility for 
them, rather than hiding behind supposedly transcendental truths” (Curry 
2011:153). Stone agrees, emphasising that accepting moral pluralism does not 
mean that we as a moral community are relieved from striving to find more 
universal and better answers, nor that we can “flip a coin” when we face 
difficult choices. Rather, it gives us the opportunity to exercise our freedom 
and define our characters (Stone 2003:201), a central part of developing a 
virtuous character in virtue ethics.  
(...) ethics is not, and never can be, like mathematics or the so-called exact 
sciences. It cannot provide a watertight set of rules, to be applied mechanically, 
that will save anyone the time and trouble of some hard thinking, and feeling, 
when confronted with a real, specific and unique situation that presents an 
ethical dilemma (Curry 2011:10).  
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Moral pluralism, Curry emphasises, means that every view must be heard, also 
anthropocentric views, as no view is universally right. Moral pluralism might 
therefore be hard for many ecological ethicists to accept, and it is according to 
him a minority view among ecological ethicists today. However, he reminds 
us, it also means that the most common view - that when human interests 
conflict with the well-being of others, the latter must give way - cannot be 
taken for granted (Curry 2011:154-155).  
 
Callicott agrees with Stone and Curry that a monistic system fails to integrate 
our diverse moral concerns. However, he does not argue for moral pluralism:  
The moral pluralists' inability clearly to articulate a criterion for choosing 
among several inconsistent courses of action, indicated by several 
incommensurable moral theories, is not itself a terribly serious problem (…) 
Rather, in my opinion, it is a symptom of a deeper, more distressing malaise – 
the disengagement of ethics from metaphysics and moral philosophy (Callicott 
2003:214).  
As mentioned earlier, ecological ethics presents us with as diverse issues as an 
individual cow or butterfly, a coral reef, endangered species and the ozone 
layer. Aware of the diversity of these issues, and that a monistic systems is not 
sufficient to tackle this, Callicott still feels that we must maintain a coherent 
sense of self and world - a unified world view. “Such unity enables us 
rationally to select among or balance out the contradictory or inconsistent 
demands made upon us when the multiple social circles in which we may 
operate overlap and come into conflict” (Callicott 2003:214). And even more 
importantly, he argues, a unified world view like this “gives our lives purpose, 
direction, coherency, and sanity” (Callicott 2003:214). Callicott thus 
advocates for a third alternative, that is neiter entirely monostic nor entirely 
pluralistic:  
[A] univocal ethical theory embedded in a coherent world view that provides, 
nevertheless, for a multiplicity of hierarchically ordered and variously 
“textured” moral relationships (and thus duties, responsibilities, and so on) each 
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corresponding to and supporting our multiple, varied, and hierarchically ordered 
social relationships (Callicott 2003:215). 
If we accept this, he says, then we can discard the competing and inconsistent 
metaphysics of morals. He is aware that some might find his view pluralistic, 
but argues that it is not, as it involves one metaphysics of morals:  
one concept of the nature of morality (as rooted in moral sentiments), one 
concept of human nature (that we are social animals voyaging with fellow 
creatures in the odyssey of evolution), one moral psychology (that we respond 
in subtly shaded ways to the fellow members of our multiple, diverse, tiered 
communities and to those communities per se) (Callicott 2003:216).  
Callicott's view seems like a hybrid between monism – the idea that we have 
to have some unity in our world view - and pluralism, as he emphasises that 
different ethical choices demand different ethical frameworks. There is no 
universal answer to every ethical dilemma.  
 
Multicentrism 
 
Some ecological ethicists would say that the expanding moral circle-principle 
in itself is anthropocentric, even though it gives room for intrinsic value of 
more-than-human nature. The line is first drawn around human beings, then it 
expands in several wider circles around those we chose to value the most. That 
humans place themselves in the middle is in a way anthropocentric in itself. 
Those who argue for a more holistic view, like Leopold, Abram or Næss, 
would not chose to draw any circles like these. They would instead draw one 
huge circle around the entire Earth, with every entity inside. Even though this 
seems like a more ecocentric view, it is difficult to be completely de-centred, 
and Curry even argues that it is impossible. As a human it would be difficult, 
if not impossible, not to perceive the world as a human. It is only natural that 
in our perception of the world, we are the centres. However, if it is 
anthropocentric to discuss who should be included in the moral circle, but 
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impossible to be completely de-centred and view the world as an outsider or as 
anyone else than who we are, what then, is the alternative? Curry advocates 
multicentrism as a third option. It is neither anthropocentric nor demands us to 
view the world as de-centred from ourselves. A multicentric view “encourages 
the awareness that that life consists of many centres, not only human ones” 
(Curry 2011:157). A human is the centre of his or her own life, as is a dolphin 
and a cactus. Or as Bergljot Børresen puts it: “The human is born human-
centred, anthropocentric, as the lion is leocentric, the wolf canocentric etc.” 
(Børresen 2007:55, my own translation). Anthony Weston also argues for a 
multicentric view like this, saying that we cannot have an adequate idea of 
another being until we have offered them the space, time and possibility to 
enter a relationship with us (Weston in Curry 2011:156). “[O]nce other centres 
are acknowledged, always somewhat opaque to us as we are to them, there is 
no alternative but to work things out together, as far as possible, when all are 
affected by the decisions taken” (Weston in Curry 2011:156-157). 
 
A Summary of Part One 
 
As we have seen, ecological ethics is an immensely vast field, consisting of a 
variety of very different views concerning how we should live and act in 
relationship with more-than-human nature. What all of these views have in 
common, though, is the acknowledgement that how humans live and act 
affects the rest of nature in some way, and hence that ethics should not just 
deal with how to treat other humans. By discussing what has value, intrinsic or 
instrumental, we can expand our moral circle to include more and more parts 
of more-than-human nature, from other animals, plants and inanimate entities 
to species and ecosystems. However, the more entities included in the circle, 
the more difficult it is to live in accordance with our ethics in practice. How 
should we prioritise, when every entity in nature has intrinsic value? As we 
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have seen, some argue that we should make hierarchies based on interests or 
other criteria, while others argue that it makes no sense to put one entity above 
another, as every entity is a part of nature's reciprocity and is thus sustained by 
each other. It is difficult to navigate through every ethical dilemma we face 
with only one ethical framework. We should therefore discuss whether we 
should strive to find this one universal ethical framework, or if we should use 
pluralism, or perhaps a hybrid version. It can also be discussed whether 
humans are the only centres, or the only ones who can value anything 
intrinsically, and thus whether the constructed moral circle-principle is of any 
use at all. Why should we, as only one among millions of other species, decide 
what is right? As Curry argues, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for 
an individual to view the world as not centred around themselves. It is difficult 
enough to imagine how other humans perceive the world, and even more 
difficult to imagine the world from the perspective of an ostrich or a shark. 
How can we, as human beings, even try to imagine how a tulip, a plankton or 
a mountain perceives the world? Detaching ourselves from our human centres 
should perhaps not be the goal, and multicentrism offers a view where this is 
acknowledged – as long as we also acknowledge that non-humans are also 
centres and have a perception of the world on their own.  
 
As we have seen, human beings have a very special position on Earth today, 
where we can control and influence most other entities and where our actions 
affects other parts of nature on a huge scale. While the purpose of ecological 
ethics perhaps is to find the answers to how we best should live in relation 
with more-than-human nature, I think the most important goal at this stage is 
to discuss it at all - to give room for non-anthropocentric views in discussions 
regarding the treatment of more-than-human nature, and to ask deeper 
questions, both to others when discussing and to ourselves. In part two of this 
thesis, the discussion about Norwegian whaling will be used as an example to 
illustrate how most discussions about issues involving non-humans do not use 
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ecological ethics consciously as a central part of this discussion. As we will 
see, sometimes those who actively try to do so are at times even made fun of. 
However, if we do use ecological ethics as a platform when discussing issues 
regarding non-humans – in this case whaling - and ask deeper questions about 
intrinsic value and our relationship with the rest of nature, would we be 
satisfied with the same answers we received before we applied these ethical 
approaches to the discussion? If not, what would this imply?  
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Part Two – Norwegian Whaling and Ecological 
Ethics 
 
Part two consists of four chapters. The first chapter is a brief presentation of 
the history of Norwegian whaling. The second is about minke whales, which 
is the type of whale that is commercially hunted in Norway. The third chapter 
is presents “Vågehvalen – valgets kval”, the book which will be the main 
source of discussion in the last chapter of part two. In this chapter it is also 
explained why this book is still relevant for the discussion about whaling and 
other issues regarding non-humans today, even though it was published in 
1993. The fourth, and main, chapter of part two discusses three main reasons 
for continuing whaling that is presented in “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” and 
discusses these further, in the light of ecological ethics. After asking deeper 
questions about how we should live and act in relationship with whales and 
other natural entities involved in the discussion about whaling, will we be 
satisfied with the reasons presented for continuing whaling in the book? This 
last chapter of part two also discusses why it is stated in the book that those 
who ground their arguments for protecting more-than-human nature in 
ecological ethics have a legitimisation problem. Why does it seem like the 
contributors of the book and others which its views represent try to tie down a 
thourough ethical discussion about whaling? 
 
A Brief History of Norwegian Whaling 
 
Along the long Norwegian coastline, the relationship between whales and 
humans can be traced as far as 10,000-12,000 years back in time (Ringstad 
2011:5) Petroglyphs and bone discoveries as well as texts written more than a 
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thousand years ago tell us that whales were both worshiped as “God-given” 
animals but also seen as a valuable resource and source of food (Hoel et al. 
1993B:77-79). The hunting methods used so far back in time are not 
determined, but finding stranded whales and chasing whales towards the shore 
to then kill them were probably the most common ways. Harpoons, spears and 
poisonous arrows may have been used to kill the whales (Ringstad 2011:9-13).  
 
Even though Norwegians have hunted whales for hundreds, and perhaps even 
thousands of years, it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that 
Norway started to become what some like to call a “whaling nation”. At that 
time the Norwegian Sven Foyn combined the newly developed grenade 
harpoon with motorised ships, and made large scale whaling possible for the 
first time. His whaling company started its business along the coast of 
Finnmark in northern Norway in the 1860's. Other companies followed, and 
by the beginning of the 1880's, an industrial whaling business had emerged in 
this area. By the turn of the century, over-exploitation had led to a lower 
profitability, and many of the whaling companies looked for other placed to 
catch whales (Hvalfangstmuseet.no). In addition to this, many fishermen were 
not pleased with this whaling along the Norwegian coast. The minke whales 
were known to help the fishermen by driving the fish towards the shore, and 
they argued that hunting minke whales was disturbing this process. After an 
argument between fishermen and whalers that lasted for over 30 years, the 
government saw that the conflict could become dangerous and decided to step 
in. They sided with the fishermen, (Martinsen 2013:104-105), and as a result 
whales along the coast of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark (the northern part of 
Norway) were protected from whaling for ten years from 1904 (Ringstad 
2011:22).  
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By this time, the Norwegian global whaling business had already started, and 
especially after these incidents, the whaling companies searched outside 
Norwegian waters for business. During the time between the 1880's and the 
first world war, Norwegian whaling companies caught whales outside all the 
world's continents and oceans, and especially in Antarctica. Here, the 
populations of large whale species such as blue whales, humpback whales, fin 
whales and sperm whales were large. Together with a few other countries, 
Norway took part in the large scale Antarctic whaling during the majority of 
the twentieth century. The whales were hunted with Svend Foyn's methods; 
grenade harpoons and motorised ships (Hvalfangstmuseet.no). The main 
product was whale oil, but the baleens were also used (Martinsen 2013:104). 
Thus, at this time whale meat was not the main reason for commercial 
whaling, as it is today. Land stations where whale blubber was cooked to 
make oil were built, and this way of whaling, with cooking stations on land, 
was used until 1965. However, a more common and effective way was 
floating cookeries, developed in 1905 (Regjerningen.no:A) The whale bodies 
were processed in the water, tied along the side of the boat, that was either 
moored to land or stayed in calm waters. A new technology developed in 1925 
made it possible to pull the whale bodies up on deck, where it could be 
processed more efficiently. This enabled the boats to stay out in the open sea, 
which was beneficial as the risk and difficulty of processing a whale tied to 
the side of the boat in rough sea was no longer there. “The cookeries were 
now converted into floating factories and contributed to an industrial 
expansion that in addition to Norway included nations such as England, 
Germany, The Soviet Union and Japan” (Hvalfangstmuseet.no, my own 
translation). With such a large scale and effective whaling process, the whale 
populations decreased sharply, and when Norway ended its whaling in 
Antarctica after the 1967/1968 season, several of the whales species were 
threatened with extinction (Regjeringen.no:A)  
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Scientists around the world expressed concerned for the the rapid decrease in 
the number of whales as a result of whaling. In 1946 the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling was signed as a result of this. The 
International Whaling Commission was then founded, and the commission has 
since 1949 met annually to discuss everything from hunting quotas, hunting 
areas, minimum sizes of the whales hunted, conservation policies, etc. Its 
intentions is to “provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus 
make possible the orderly development of the whale industry” (IWC:A). They 
do have authorisation, but only over member states, and states are free to end 
their membership or to make reservations against decisions they do not agree 
with, which obviously restricts their actual power (Ringstad 2011:42). 
 
Today the only species of whale that is commercially hunted in Norway is the 
minke whale. The modern Norwegian whaling of minke whales began in the 
1920's. Until then highly ineffective ways of killing the minke whales were 
used, such as poisonous arrows. With this method, the whales were trapped in 
bays and then shot with arrows saturated in bacteria, causing the them to die of 
blood poisoning. This process could take several days. Ringstad says that one 
reported death took 17 days, but that so many days was unusual (Ringstad 
2011:12). Sometimes arrows without poison were used. With this method, the 
movements of the whale caused the arrow to penetrate slowly deeper into its 
body, and eventually enter its bones to cause gangrene and death (Ringstad 
2011:12). These methods were extremely painful. In the 1920's more modern 
methods for catching minke whales came into use. According to Hoel et al. 
fishermen from the Western part of Norway developed this new method, using 
the knowledge they had of whaling which they had acquired at the land 
stations along the coast, and their knowledge of the minke whales and their 
whereabouts acquired through fishing. They used small harpoon canons used 
for hunting bottlenose whales. “They combined technology and knowledge, 
and after a few years this way of hunting had spread all along the coast. 
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Whaling of minke whales was eventually conducted from nearly all parts of 
Norway” (Hoel et al. 1993B:81, my own translation). The number of boats 
involved were at its highest in 1948, when 350 boats participated in catching 
almost 4000 minke whales (Hoel et al. 1993B:85). Harpoons without 
gunpowder in the grenades, called a “cold harpoon” were used. Most of the 
whales did not die momentarily when shot with a cold harpoon, but had to be 
shot several times before they died. This method was used until 1984, when a 
new type of harpoon grenade which exploded inside the whale came into use. 
From 1985 this new harpoon was required to use (Regjeringen.no:A) In 2000 
yet another new grenade, also exploding, was introduced, and this is the one 
that is in use today. As a result of this development of new methods, in 2000-
2002, 80% of the whales died momentarily, compared to only 17% in 1981-
1983.The average time it takes a whale to die is now down to two minutes 
(Regjeringen.no:A). Still, 20% of the whales suffer for several minutes before 
they die, and 10% of the whales shot suffers for more than ten minutes. In 
addition, it is difficult to decide the exact amount of time it takes because the 
whales are in the water when they die. IWC has set the time of death to the 
time when the pectoral fins retract and become motionless, the mouth opens 
up and all movement ceases. These observations need to be seen in connection 
to observations of damage to the organs, but as this is difficult due to the 
circumstances, the time of death is most often set to the time when the whale 
stops moving. However, the minke whale's body is adapted to a life with long 
dives, which gives its body the ability to “turn off” large, energy-demanding 
organs. Some therefore suspect that the average time it takes a whale to die 
may be longer than claimed, while the whalers point out that it may be the 
other way around, as waves may cause movements in the dead whale's body, 
making it looking alive (NOAH – for animal rights).  
 
The hunting quotas set by the IWC decreased further and further up to the 
1980's, and in 1982 they decided to set a moratorium against all commercial 
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whaling from 1986. Norway did not support this decision and used their 
reservation right. However, Norway decided to end commercial whaling 
temporarily from 1986 to count the minke whale populations, and to make 
sure that to continue whaling was sustainable. Years of research resulted in 
numbers that estimated that the North-East Atlantic minke whale population 
was 86.736. This number was approved by the IWC in 1992 (Schweder 
1993:61), and the numbers were used to set sustainable hunting quotas. In 
1993 Norway started commercial whaling again, without approval from the 
IWC. Since the IWC moratorium in 1986 Norway has killed more than 10.000 
whales (Martinsen 2013:105).  
 
Norwegian whaling today is not a large industry. While whaling earlier in 
history was mostly run by whaling companies with rich investors such as 
Svend Foyn employing the whalers, whalers today are usually fishermen some 
parts of the year and whalers other parts of the year, and they have to have 
ownership of the boat to get a whaling licence. In 2008, 30 boats were given 
licence to hunt minke whales, and 27 of them took part in whaling, with a 
crew of four to eight people on each boat. The hunting quota was set to 1052 
whales, and 535 whales were caught. The number of participating boats and 
whales caught has declined during the last years, and as illustrated with the 
2008 numbers, the quotas are much higher than the number of whales caught. 
In 2013 the number of participating boats had decreased to 17, and whaling 
was described in an NRK article as a “dying industry” (Andersen and Lysvold 
2013). During the period from 1998 to 2003 the economic value of the 
whaling industry was between 21 and 27 million Norwegian kroners (NOK) 
per year. Compared to the fishing industry, which had an economic value of 
around ten billion NOK per year at the same time, the whaling industry is 
small. For whalers, who, as mentioned, are usually fishermen some parts of 
the year and whalers other parts of the year, whaling constitutes around 20% 
of their income (Regjerningen.no:A and Regjeringen.no:B). However, in 2010 
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less than 1% of fishermen took part in activities related to whaling 
(Dyrebeskyttelsen Norge et al. 2011:12). Today, the main whale product is the 
meat, not the oil or baleens. As most countries are opposed to whaling, export 
of whale meat is to a great extent not possible, and the biggest market for the 
meat is the Norwegian one. Even though the Norwegian government claims 
that the whaling industry is non-subsidised, there are several costs that are 
directly linked to the maintenance of the whaling industry, which are paid 
directly or indirectly through governmental financing. For example, the state-
owned company Innovasjon Norge spend 1-2.5 million NOK every year on 
marketing related to whaling. Some years the money spent is as much as 4-5 
million NOK. The destruction of whale blubber is another example. To get rid 
of 1200 tonnes blubber in the years 1999, 2000 and 2007 the government 
spent 11 million NOK. Another example is the DNA register of all minke 
whales caught, which is a way of securing “safety and control” over the whale 
meat on the market. From 2001 to 2007 this DNA register cost around 14.1 
million NOK. Other public expenses regarding whaling are spent on 
inspections, electronic monitoring systems, memberships in IWC and 
NAMMCO (the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission), tax reliefs for 
whalers, scientific research like the whale counting programme (around 8 
million NOK per year) and to give information about the sustainable 
Norwegian whaling to the international community (around 3.18 millions per 
year from 1992-2010). EFTEC, an independent environmental economics 
consultancy based in the UK, researched these costs on behalf of three animal 
rights organisations, and came to the conclusion that the total economic 
support that is provided from the government to maintain the Norwegian 
whaling industry (that we know of) is almost as high as the total revenues 
generated by the whaling industry. “That means that the total impact on the 
Norwegian economy, after deduction of the expenses of the whaling, must be 
negative” (Dyrebeskyttelsen Norge et al. 2011:6-8). At the same time they 
found that whale watching, even though not a large investment and a small 
focus in Norway, has an economic value of at least 12.3 million NOK per year 
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(Dyrebeskytelsen Norge et al. 2011:2). From this report, it seems like whale 
watching actually would be a more profitable industry than whaling. The 
Norwegian whaling today takes place in the Norwegian economic zone, in the 
Fish Protection Zone around Svalbard, in the Fishing Zone around by Jan 
Mayen and in international waters (Smotthavet). The whaling season is from 
April to August/September each year. All the boats have an electronic 
monitoring system installed that registers all hunting activity on board. In 
addition to this, there is a group of inspectors who ensures that the regulations 
are being followed. The whalers must take a course each year where accurate 
shooting and safety is in focus (Regjeringen.no:B).  
 
Even though the IWC does not allow commercial whaling, they do grant 
permission to catch some species of whale for scientific purposes, called 
“scientific permit whaling”, and to indigenous people, called “aboriginal 
subsistence whaling”. IWC states that: 
In several parts of the world, whale products play an important role in the 
nutritional and cultural life of native peoples. Since its inception, the IWC has 
recognised that indigenous or ‘aboriginal subsistence’ whaling is of a different 
nature to commercial whaling. It is thus not subject to the moratorium (IWC:B)  
Together with commercial whaling, scientific permit whaling and aboriginal 
subsistence whaling constitute the three different forms of whaling which the 
IWC operates with. The former is as mentioned earlier not allowed. Norway 
and Iceland are the only countries that practice commercial whaling today, 
both under objection to the moratorium or under reservation to it. These 
contries establish their own catch limits, but they must provide information 
about those catches a well as associated scientific data to the IWC. Russia has 
also registered an objection to the moratorium, however they do not exercise it 
(IWC:C) According to The Norwegian Whaling Museum, in the season 
2007/2008 the following countries caught whales, for one of the three 
purposes mentioned above: Japan (912), Faroe Islands (856), Norway (595), 
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Russia (132), USA (64), Iceland (45) and St. Vincent (1). 
(Hvalfangstmuseet.no). Japan has hunted whales under a scientific permit 
whaling. However, in the end of March 2014 the United Nation's International 
Court of Justice came to the conclusion that Japan's whaling is not scientific in 
nature, and could rather be seen as commercial whaling. Japan has now been 
ordered to stop hunting whales (Lee 2014). Whether they intend to abide by 
this decision, or to continue commercial whaling like Norway and Iceland, 
remains to be seen.  
 
There is no doubt that the Norwegian government is taking their self-
appointed role as a manager of their so-called “whale resources” seriously. 
They are members of the IWC even though they do not agree with the 
moratorium, they ensure that the whaling is sustainable by counting the 
populations and setting strict hunting quotas and rules that needs to be 
followed to be granted permission to catch whales, it is required to use the 
most effective killing methods and they spend time and money to develop new 
methods so that the whaling is as humane as possible. The government and 
others who are pro-whaling may not want to repeat what took place in 
Antarctica where several whale species were hunted almost to extinction, but 
they do seem proud of their history as a whaling nation and of the, according 
to themselves, sustainable and responsible way of whaling that takes place 
today. However, the number of participating boats and whales caught are 
declining because of the declining popularity of whale meat, even though the 
Norwegian government spend millions of NOK every year to maintain what 
they see as an important part of Norwegian tradition. As stated by two NRK 
journalists regarding the small number of boats taking part in whaling during 
the last years: An honourable part of Norwegian history is reclining (Andersen 
and Lysvold 2013).  
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The Minke Whale 
 
The minke whale is a species of whale within the suborder of baleen whales. 
Together with toothed whales, baleen whales constitute the two main groups 
of whales. There are around 70 species of toothed whales and 14 species of 
baleen whales (Havforskningsinstituttet). Minke whales are one of the 
smallest baleen whales. While the main food source for toothed whales is fish, 
and for baleen whales zooplankton, minke whales eat both fish and 
zooplankton, and are for this reason often called omnivores. They live in 
temperate and polar waters in both the northern and southern hemisphere, and 
there are three different known types of minke whales: Those who live in the 
northern hemisphere (Balaenoptera acutorostrata), those who live in the 
southern hemisphere (Balaenoptera bonaerensis) and dwarf minke whales 
(Balaenoptera acutorostrata) who live in the southern hemisphere. The 
northern minke whales can grow up to 9.1 meters long and weigh four to five 
tonnes. The southern minke whales are longer, with a maximum length of 10.7 
meters, while the dwarf minke whales have a maximum length of 
approximately 7.4 meters. Minke whale females are a bit larger than males. 
They reach maturity at the age of seven to eight years. Females have a 10-11 
months gestation period, and usually give birth to one calf a year. Minke 
whales can live up to 60 years (Hoelzel and Stern 2000). 
 
         
Figure 2: “Minke Whale” (MarineBio Conservation Society). 
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Minke whales are one of the least studied baleen whales, and there are aspects 
of their behaviour that humans do not know. They appear to be mainly 
solitary, most often observed alone or in small groups. However, recent 
research on dwarf minke whales reveal a more social and communicative 
behaviour than previously assumed (WCD). More information about 
individual calling behaviour is important to obtain to increase understanding 
of the social interactions between these marine mammals. They make very 
loud sounds, up to 152 decibels, which is as loud as a jet taking off. According 
to the MarineBio Conservation Society they “make series (trains) of grunts, 
thuds and raspy sounds”, which may be used in communication with other 
minke whales and for echolocation (MarineBio Conservation Society). By 
using passive acoustic monitoring to track minke whales in the northwest 
Atlantic, scientists quite recently (the research was conducted from 2009 to 
2011) found clues in the individual calling behaviours and movements of these 
whales. Although the specific behavioural function of the call patterns still is 
unknown, they discovered that the sound sequences may be important in 
social interactions between individuals, or may reflect age or sex differences. 
“The whales seem to regularly use different patterns of calling when in 
hearing proximity of one other. We don't know yet what purposes these 
patterns serve or which sex is producing the calls” (Risch 2014). A lot is still 
unknown to humans concerning minke whales, and to obtain more knowledge, 
for instance of their social behaviour, they need to be studied further. 
  
Vågehvalen – Valgets Kval 
 
“Vågehvalen – valgets kval” is a book on Norwegian whaling of minke whales 
and why this whaling can be argued to be responsible. The title translates into 
something resembling “The minke whale – a though choice”. The title 
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contains a pun, as “kval” can mean both “choice” and “whale” in one of 
Norway's two official written languages. The book was published in 1993 with 
support from among others The Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs 
(now The Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries), and includes chapters 
written by the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. Biology, zoology, economics, social anthropology, veterinary 
medicine and environmental NGO's are among the fields of the other 
contributors of the book. The many chapters address whale biology, minke 
whale population and how to count it, sustainable resource management, how 
the whales are being hunted (both earlier in history and more modern 
methods), economic perspectives, international perspectives including 
information about the IWC, cultural perspectives, recipes with whale meat and 
the claimed health benefits of eating it, and the debate about whaling, 
including a chapter about ethics.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Norwegian government chose to use their 
reservation right against the IWC moratorium and to continue commercial 
whaling in 1993, after a seven year break to count the North-East Atlantic 
minke whale population. The public protests against this decision were large 
and received a lot of attention in the media, both within and outside Norway. 
It is not a coincidence that this book was published the same year as the 
whaling started again. As the editors state in the preface: “This book project 
has been finished in a hurry. The actuality of the topic has made a fast 
production necessary” (Hoel et al. 1993A:18, my own translation). The 
government and others who were pro-whaling obviously felt the need for a 
book that would “calm the population down” by arguing, through every 
chapter, that to continue whaling was, indeed, the right choice to make. The 
editors themselves write in the preface that the purpose of the book is public 
education. “The book is written with a hope that it can contribute to public 
education about the political ”hot potato” which the minke whale issue has 
	  57	  
become” (Hoel et al. 1993A:17, my own translation). Siri Martinsen, leader of 
the Norwegian animals rights organisation “NOAH – for animal rights”, 
writes that the Norwegian government worked hard in the beginning of the 
1990's to make the Norwegian population identify themselves with whaling. 
“The immediate reason for politically creating a “whaling nation” was 
obviously a wish to gather support from the people before the political 
decision to resume whaling against the will of the international community” 
(Martinsen 2013:108, my own translation). An alliance whose purpose was to 
promote whaling, called “Høge Nord Allianse”, was established in 1990. It 
received almost all its funding from the Norwegian government (Martinsen 
2013:109). Their (and the government's) goal was to improve the international 
media coverage, and to be a voice in international arenas such as the IWC, “to 
reduce the pressure from opponents towards the Norwegian government, and 
hence to increase the probability of more pro-whaling resolutions” (Frøvik and 
Jusnes in Martinsen 2013:109, my own translation). This book thus represents 
the government's as well as other pro-whaling views on Norwegian whaling, 
and even though it tries to do the other side justice by presenting some other 
views and discussing some arguments against whaling, in all the chapters the 
purpose of the book shines through - it is a 346 pagelong argument for 
continue whaling. 
 
“Vågehvalen – valgets kval” is interesting because it was published with 
support from the government, and includes chapters written by government 
representatives. It thus represent Norway's official views. The fact that it was 
meant as public education also adds an interesting element to it, because it 
means that this was intended as a universal standpoint. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, the main reasons for continue to hunt minke whales presented in 
the book are that ending whaling will mean more whales (who eat fish) and 
therefore less fish for the fishing industry, that the whales do not suffer more 
than many other animals we kill, and that the Norwegian whaling today is a 
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sustainable way of managing our resources, as the minke whale is not a 
threatened species. Even though the book was published 21 years ago, it is still 
highly relevant for a discussion about whaling and ecological ethics today. I 
base this claim on two main arguments. The first one is that the arguments 
used in the books are exactly the same arguments that are being used today. 
For example, in a white paper from 2003-2004 about Norwegian politics 
regarding marine mammals (St.meld. nr. 27 (2003-2004) Norsk 
sjøpattedyrpolitikk) it is mentioned that whaling is more humane than many 
other ways of killing non-human animals. Some demand a guarantee that all 
whales are killed momentarily, it says. Further it states that “This is a wishful 
target, but unfortunately impossible in practice, and it is not known in any 
business where animals are killed, including in the slaughtering of farmed 
animals” (regjeringen.no:A, my own translations). It is stated that the killing 
method for minke whales in Norway today is far more effective and humane 
than in any other form of hunting (perhaps except in seal hunting they add – 
another issue where the Norwegian government experience pressure to end 
hunting), and also that to compare the killing methods of whales to killing 
methods of farmed animals is not very useful because farmed animals are 
under physical control when the killing happens. “But in contrast to farmed 
animals, most whales in Norway die without any stress and without knowing 
that they are being hunted” (regjeringen.no:A, my own translation). The same 
white paper also mentions that whales constitute a threat against the fishing 
industry by eating fish that we rather would prefer to eat ourselves. The minke 
whale’s consuption is 5.5 million tonnes biomass per year, it is said. “To 
compare, altogether the Norwegian fishing industry harvested 2.74 million 
tonnes from the same ecosystem in 2002. This reflects the competitiveness 
that must be accounted for when managing the species” (regjeringen.no:A, my 
own translation). In a more recent white paper about the same subject from 
2009 (St.meld. nr. 46 (2009-2009) Norsk sjøpattedyrpolitikk) it is highlighted 
that the Norwegian whaling is a responsible and sustainable way of managing 
our ocean resources: 
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The harvesting of our living marine resources is based on scientific 
documentation and follows international law. Norway's right to harvest the 
living marine resources, including the marine mammals, in our huge and rich 
seas, is based on taking seriously the principle of sustainability, based on the 
best available scientific knowledge (regjeringen.no:B, my own translation).  
These arguments, used since “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” was published, are 
still applied whenever the topic of whaling is discussed. Even Yngve Ekern, 
journalist in one of Norway's largest newspapers and one of the country's best 
known food writers, who is usually an advocate for animal welfare and critical 
of the modern food industry, use these arguments when he encourages people 
to buy whale meat. “Just for the record: Our whaling is undeniably 
sustainable. Animal welfare? Yes, the whales sing their way through life. 
Chickens do not. The killing is humane. No other form of hunting is 
monitored as intensely” (Ekern 2013, my own translation). In this quote, 
Ekern continues to argue that whaling is good because it is sustainable, and 
that it is OK because other animals (in this case chickens) are treated worse. 
Another example can be found in an online news article, also from 2013, 
announcing that the Norwegian whaling season has started. In a short 
summary of some facts about whaling it says that the methods used in 
Norwegian whaling are fully abreast with those used in other big game 
hunting. “This is the case both regarding how fast death occurs and regarding 
the number of animals who are wounded but do not die of the shots. The 
killing methods are no worse those used for farmed animals in the 
slaughterhouses” (Andersen and Lysvold 2013, my own translation). It also 
says that “Norway has set its own quota for minke whales within responsible 
sustainable limits” (Andersen and Lysvold 2013, my own translation). In the 
article the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs at that time, Lisbeth Berg 
Hansen, highlights this argument, saying that the quota set gives “adequate 
certainty for a sustainable catch of the minke whale population” (Hansen in 
Andersen and Lysvold 2013, my own translation). One of the pictures 
included in the article shows a whale stomach and its content. The text below 
the photo says that “The stomach of the minke whale reveals that it feeds on 
fish” (Andersen and Lysvold 2013, my own translation). In this article, all of 
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the three arguments from “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” are mentioned – the 
killing methods are not less humane than the methods used in the killing of 
many other kinds of animals, the whaling is sustainable, and it highlights that 
the minke whales consumes fish. The arguments has thus not changed much 
since the book was published, more than 20 years ago. 
 
The second reason why the book is still highly relevant for a discussion on 
whaling and ecological ethics today, is that the awareness of ecological ethics' 
role in this discussions concerning non-humans is still missing, and the lack of 
acceptance for arguments consciously based on ecological ethics is as evident 
today as it was when “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” was written. While the 
public debate on whaling has been relatively quiet for many years, a related 
debate about fur farming is alive and well. This debate, which is mainly about 
whether Norway should continue to allow fur farming or not, is a good 
example to illustrate that also ongoing public debates about non-humans lack 
the acceptance of arguments based on ecological ethics - also from 
government representatives. Ola Borten Moe, Minister of Petroleum and 
Energy at the time, said in an online news article in September 2013 that the 
arguments against the fur industry are based on feelings, and that people to an 
increasing extent have a “Walt Disney-like view on animals” (Hegvik 2013). 
What does he mean with a “Walt Disney-like view on animals”? Does it mean 
that one should not “anthropomorphise” other animals by giving them human 
characteristics, the way Disney does? In this case, what kind of human 
characteristics does he question? That mice wear clothes and travel the world 
as detectives, or a baby deer's grief over the loss of his mother? If he means 
the former, this is an irrelevant statement, as no animal right activist claims 
this. If he means the latter, does this mean that he does not acknowledge that 
humans and other animals share the ability to experience stress, pain, grief, 
joy, love, and other feelings? If he thinks that consciousness and the ability to 
experience emotional feelings are ascribed to humans alone, he is on very thin 
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ice. In 2012 an international group of cognitive neuroscientists, 
neuropharmacologists, neuroanatomists and computational neuroscientists 
gathered to reassess the conscious experiences of non-human animals. As a 
result “The Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness” was signed, stating that 
humans are not unique among animals in possessing the neurological 
substrates that generate consciousness: 
We declare the following: “The absence of a neocortex does not appear to 
preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence 
indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, 
and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to 
exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates 
that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that 
generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, 
and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological 
substrates.” (The Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness 2012).  
Critique towards those who acknowledge that humans and other animals share 
the ability to experience a variety of emotional feelings can also be found in 
“Vågehvalen - valgets kval”, where it is said that some give whales “human 
characteristics” (Olsen 1993:314). Bergljot Børresen reflects upon this 
anthropomorphism argument, concluding that the statement itself is highly 
anthropocentric. To acknowledge that humans and other animals share many 
of the same abilities “does not mean that the animals are given “human 
characteristics”, but rather that humans acknowledge their profound 
“animalism” (Børresen 2007:53, my own translation). She says that non-
human animals cannot resemble humans, just as a granddad cannot have a 
characteristic from his grandchild. It is the grandchild who is like its ancestry. 
“The human is chimpanzee-like, the chimpanzee is not human-like” (Børresen 
2007:53, my own translation). In addition to basing his argument on an 
anthropocentric view, it seems like Borten Moe by using the term “Walt 
Disney-like” even tries to make fun of those who do not share his 
anthropocentric world-view. In the article he also expresses his concern for 
what will happen if the animal rights activists get their will and the fur farms 
are closed. He says that if the fur farms are closed the animal rights activists 
will not stop there, and he is, in his own word, afraid that the chicken farm he 
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owns with 30,000 animals will be the next to go (Hegvik 2013). It thus seems 
to me as though his arguments for continued fur farming is that those who 
argue that the animals kept in fur farms share with us a variety of “human 
characteristisc” for some reason have a Walt Disney-like view on animals 
(whatever this means) and should therefore not be taken seriously. And if they 
are taken seriously, other highly questionable ways of exploiting non-human 
animals also might come into focus. It seems as though he is afraid of Næss' 
challenge to question deeper, and what this may lead to. In this particular 
debate with Borten Moe there is clearly no room for fact-based arguments 
about the animals themselves and their well-documented feelings and needs, 
nor about the ethical questions about keeping non-human animals locked in 
small cages and exploiting their lives to make luxury products.  
 
Many of the arguments for continuing fur farming found in public debates are 
similar to the arguments for whaling. For example, a common argument for 
continue fur farming in Norway is that the conditions for animals in the fur 
farming industry are worse in China and other parts of the world. This is 
similar to the argument used to defend whaling that says that other animals are 
treated even worse than the whales, and therefore whaling is OK. In the fur 
farming debate it is also said that fur farming is sustainable, especially 
compared to other ways of making clothes – another argument that is also 
used in the whaling debate. This claim, however, is wrong. In fact, fur is 
among the least environmentally friendly materials for making clothes. There 
is a considerable amount of transportation involved when processing the fur, 
often across the globe, and toxic chemicals are used in the process. “The 
chemicals used are toxic, and may cause both respiratory problems and cancer, 
in addition to environmental problems” (Dyrevernalliansen). The production 
of one kilo mink fur causes an emission of around 140 kilos of CO2, while the 
production of one kilo wool emits around 20 kilos CO2. Polyester, which fake 
fur often is made of, has a significantly lower CO2 emission than wool, and is 
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thus a much more environmentally friendly material than fur 
(Dyrevernalliansen). A final central argument is that the animals in fur farms 
eat leftovers from other farming industries, so the fur farming industry does us 
a favour by making it easier to farm fish and other animals as the leftovers do 
not need to be taken care of in other ways: 
Both foxes and minks are predatory animals, and the animals in fur farms eat 
food that to a large extent is made of bi-products from the slaughterhouses and 
the fish farming industry. Thus, the fur farming industry works as a renovator 
for the food industry and the society at large, because the industry can make use 
of most of the raw materials that the food industry cannot use (Landbruk.no).  
This argument is similar to the argument that says that the whaling industry 
does the fishing industry a favour.  
 
The example with the fur industry is mentioned to illustrate that other issues 
regarding non-humans often are debated in the same way as the whaling issue. 
The same kind of arguments are often used to defend the exploitation of non-
humans, and there is often a lack of awareness of how ecological ethics is used 
in the discussion, and even a lack of acceptance for those who use ecological 
ethics consciously as a platform for the debate. This shows that “Vågehvalen – 
valgets kval” and the views it represent are still highly relevant to use when 
discussing matters regarding non-humans, such as whaling. The next chapter 
addresses three of the most common arguments for defending Norwegian 
whaling, as mentioned earlier, and discusses them in light of ecological ethics, 
before discussing why ecological ethics are not accepted as a central part of 
the debate. 
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Norwegian Whaling and Ecological Ethics 
 
Ecological ethics is a platform that enables us to discuss who or what counts 
in ethics and what this has to say about how we should live and act in relation 
to more-than-human nature, not only to other human beings. Even though 
whaling clearly involves human/more-than-human relations, and the choices 
we make regarding this relation affect more-than-human nature, ecological 
ethics has traditionally not been used as a platform when discussing whaling, 
and arguments that are consciously grounded in ecological ethics are often not 
welcomed in the debate – sometimes they are even made fun of. But what 
happens with the arguments when they are discussed consciously using 
ecological ethics as a platform for the discussion? Do they still appear as valid 
arguments for continued whaling? 
 
When the Norwegian government decided to continue whaling despite the 
IWC moratorium, several countries strongly objected this decision. Bill 
Clinton, president of the United States of America at that time, said that this 
action “justified the use of sanctions”, and all over the world Norwegian 
products were boycotted. The protests from animal rights organisations and 
environmental organisations were huge, and fronted by celebrities such as 
Paul McCartney (Pedersen 2011). There were also protests in Norway. 
However, following this, the public debate about whaling in Norway slowed 
and has been relatively quiet for many years. There was some media coverage 
around the Norwegian Green Party's wish to end whaling and seal hunting 
before the election in 2013, and then there is the occasional demonstration 
from animal rights organisations and some articles, for instance about the 
declining participation in whaling. There are currently no significant public 
debates about Norwegian whaling, and if something comes up from those who 
are pro whaling, like Ekern's call to buy whale meat, the same arguments are 
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used as when the public debate was still strong. Thus, the debate has not really 
changed, developed or progressed since the publication of “Vågehvalen – 
valgets kval” was published and Norway resumed whaling in 1993. The 
whales are still hunted for the same reasons as described in the book, and the 
awareness of ecological ethics in the debate is still low. Thus it seems like the 
debate has not become quiet necessarily because those who wish to continue 
whaling have the best arguments, but because non-anthropocentric arguments 
concerning the intrinsic value of more-than-human nature are not discussed 
thoroughly, and are often as good as dismissed before the discussion has even 
started. Perhaps the debate would become less stagnant, and even change 
course, if ecological ethics was added as central part of the debate? 
 
In “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” the Norwegian whaling industry is defended 
with the same arguments one is met with today when discussing the issue. The 
first main argument is that more whales equals less fish for us to hunt and eat, 
because the minke whales eat some of the same species of fish as humans like 
to eat, and therefore whaling is important. The second argument is that 
whaling is not less humane than most other forms of hunting or killing non-
human animals. For example is it more common that the animals shot do not 
die momentarily in hunting on land. In addition, whales live their entire lives 
in freedom unlike farmed animals who often are held in small enclosures or 
cages. The third argument is that whaling is a sustainable way of managing 
our natural resources, as the minke whale is not an endangered species. These 
reasons have been used since, as seen among other places in the white papers 
from 2003 and 2009 and in more recent public statements, like Ekern's 
writings. Those who oppose whaling must therefore “prove” that more whales 
does not equal less fish, that whaling is less humane than other ways of killing 
non-human animals, and that whaling is not a sustainable way of managing 
our resources. Peter Sandøe, the author of the chapter “Ethics and whaling” in 
the book, says that because it seems like the supporters of whaling have the 
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arguments on their side, those against it may use ethics as a last resort in their 
attempt to end whaling. Sandøe in fact initiates the ethics chapter by saying 
that those who use ethics to argue against whaling have a “legitimisation 
problem” (Sandøe 1993:151).  
 
This situation, where those who oppose whaling have to prove why whales 
should be given moral consideration, is known in philosophy as “the burden of 
proof”. This phenomenon is not only evident when discussing whaling, but 
when discussing any matter regarding non-humans. Because anthropocentrism 
is the dominant world view in the Western world, the burden of proof lies with 
those who wish to widen the moral circle to include anyone other than human 
beings. Those who wish to continue business-as-usual do not need to “prove” 
their arguments in the same way, as the current situation - where humans are 
in the middle of the moral circle, and usually the only species within it - is 
taken as a given. It is up to those who do not agree with this world view to 
prove why, not the other way around. Martin Gorke writes about the burden of 
proof in the book “The death of our planet's species: A challenge to ecology 
and ethics”. With the protection and preservation of species as the example, he 
says that “(…) opponents of measures for protecting species should be aware 
that the reason they are usually the winners in public debate is that in the 
context of anthropocentrism the burden of proof usually rests with those 
interested in protecting species” (Gorke 2003:198). Further he states that 
“Opponents of species protection are not the ones who must explain why their 
economic interests or personal preferences justify endangering a species” 
(Gorke 2003:198). Gorke argues that explaining why species should be 
protected is not only an ethical challenge, but also a practical challenge 
because there are three prerequisites that must be met before those who have 
defined this burden of proof accept the case for protection. First, the utility of 
the species must be known. Second, this utility must be quantifiable. And 
third, “when subjected to a cost-benefit analyses it must be shown to weigh 
	  67	  
more than potential costs or competing utility values” Gorke 2003:137-138). 
Gorke describes the job of satisfying all of these three prerequisites as “an 
almost insurmountable hurdle” (Gorke 2003:138). Those with an 
anthropocentric world view defines this burden of proof where everything is 
measured by their instrumental value for humans, and to argue for the 
protection of more-than-human nature is difficult when the arguments for 
protecting it must meet prerequisites like these to be accepted as legitimate. 
When discussing whether or not to end whaling, the burden of proof lies with 
those who wish to end whaling – they must prove why the arguments in 
“Vågehvalen – valgets kval” are wrong. However, to prove that whaling does 
not result in more fish for humans to eat, that whaling is worse for the whales 
than for example hunting is for the deer, or that whaling is not sustainable may 
not be the main concern for those who oppose whaling. This is because their 
arguments may be grounded in ecological ethics, and they may be interested in 
others' interests in addition to those of humans, and in addition to those of 
whales as well. Instead of arguing about killing methods and minke whale 
populations, they may ask deeper questions such as: Is it right to kill whales so 
that we then can kill even more fish than we already do? Is it right to harm 
whales because other animals are harmed even worse or because they do not 
belong to an endangered species? Is it right to kill other animals at all? And is 
it right to describe whales and other natural entities as “our resources”?  
 
The rest of this chapter discusses the main arguments from the Norwegian 
government and other contributors of the book “Vågehvalen – valgets kval”. 
In contrast to most of the discussion in the book this discussion will 
consciously be based on ecological ethics, using the overview in part one as a 
platform to discuss Norwegian whaling, and engage the readers in some deep 
questioning. After discussing the same arguments in the light of ecological 
ethics, asking deeper questions about intrinsic value and our relationship with 
more-than-human nature, will we come to the same conclusions?  
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More whales equals less fish for the fishing industry. (Or, is it OK to kill 
whales so that we can kill even more fish?) 
 
The first main argument presented in “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” is that the 
minke whales, by eating large amounts of fish, compete with the human 
fishing industry. Therefore, whaling is important as it leads to more fish for 
the fishing industry. This is mentioned numerous times throughout the book. It 
is for example said that the minke whales’ menu is comprehensive and that 
they therefore “are real competitors against humans in the use of ocean 
resources” (Schulz 1993:240, my own translation) and that “The minke whale 
eats large amounts of fish, the same fish as humans also eat. If the whale 
population becomes large, humans will not be able to harvest the fish 
populations to that extent that is necessary and desirable” (Holst 1993:319, my 
own translation). The book states that whaling itself is not a big industry with 
high a economical value (Schulz 1993:240), but we have to put economic 
value on the fish the minke whale consumes (Holst 1993:319), as it constitutes 
an indirect cost for the Norwegian fishing industry (Longva 1993:115). It is 
said that the value of the fish the minke whale consumes may be much larger 
than the value of the whaling itself. “This is one of the central arguments that 
has been used from the governments side to justify Norwegian whaling” 
(Longva 1993:115, my own translation).  
 
However, a growing body of research now shows that whales and other 
marine mammals may have a different role in their ecosystems than previously 
assumed, as their presence may in fact increase fish populations. This research 
has been conducted by among others J.J. McCarthy and J. Roman in 2010. 
They state that while microbes, zooplankton and fish have been given a lot of 
attention, marine mammals have largely been ignored or dismissed when 
studying the cycle of nitrogen in coastal waters. Their research found that 
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marine mammals such as whales can enhance primary productivity in their 
feeding areas by concentrating nitrogen near the surface through the release of 
flocculent fecal plumes. It is well known that zooplankton, invertebrates and 
fish contribute to a downward transport of nutritions (nitrogen, phosphorous 
and iron) from the euphotic zone (the upper water column, which receives 
sunlight). Fish and invertebrates through the downward flux of aggregates, 
feces and vertical migration, and copepods and other zooplankton by 
producing sinking pellets, respiring and excreting at depth during migration 
cycles (McCarthy and Roman 2010). This process is called “the biological 
pump”. It has been presumed that the fecal matter of whales is lost to deep 
waters, and that they are therefore also contributing to the biological pump. 
However, several pieces of evidence indicate that most of the nitrogen 
released by marine mammals actually stays in the euphotic zone, and so they 
play a different role in nutrient recycling than others in their ecosystem. In 
contrast to fish and other creatures in these ecosystems, by diving deep and 
often feeding in deeper waters and releasing nitrogenous compounds that stay 
in shallow waters, whales “effectively create an upwards pump, enhancing 
nutrient availability for primary production in locations where whales gather 
to feed” (McCarthy and Roman 2010). This is called “the whale pump” (see 
figure 2).  
 
These findings should have important implications for whaling policies, 
McCarthy and Roman say. As we have seen, an important argument from 
supporters of whaling, including the Norwegian government, is that minke 
whales should be hunted to limit their competition with humans for certain 
species of fish. McCarthy and Roman says that no data have yet been 
forthcoming to support this logic. On the contrary, marine mammals provide 
important ecosystem services that most likely increases the fish populations. 
“In coastal areas, whales retain nutrients locally, increasing ecosystem 
productivity and perhaps raising the carrying capacity for other marine 
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consumers, including commercial fish species” (McCarthy and Roman 2010). 
Thus, an unintended effect of whaling, they say, could be “reduced availability 
of nitrogen in the euphotic zone and decreased overall productivity” 
(McCarthy and Roman 2010). 
 
 
Figure 3: “A Conceptual Model of the Whale Pump” (McCarthy and Roman 2010). 
 
This particular study was, of course, not available when “Vågehvalen – 
valgets kval” was published. However, already in 1983, ten years before the 
publication of the book, research with results that pointed in the same 
direction had been conducted. Kanwisher and Ridgeway noted in 1983 that 
whales could play an analogous role to upwelling, “lifting nutrients from deep 
water, and releasing fecal material that tends to disperse rather than sink when 
it is released” (Kanwisher and Ridgeway in McCarthy and Roman 2010). 
Even though “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” mentions that it is assumed that 
more whales equals less fish, other alternatives are not presented or discussed, 
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even though relevant research indicating otherwise had been conducted years 
earlier. By presenting uncertain facts as public education, not taking into 
consideration research revealing other results, it certainly seems like a 
balanced treatment of existing knowledge was not the intention when writing 
the book. And defenders of whaling still use this argument today.  
 
Even though it seems like one of the main arguments for supporting whaling is 
no longer legitimate (or at least highly questionable) to use because of 
scientific results, the argument should also be discussed in the light of ethics, 
as it is highly anthropocentric - the reason for killing whales is to be able to 
kill more fish than we already do. This argument shows no moral concern for 
either the whales or the fish. This brings us back to the discussion about 
intrinsic value that was dealt with in part one of the thesis, and whether it is 
morally OK to kill other animals when one has a choice. “Vågehvalen – 
valgets kval” does bring about the question of whether or not it is morally OK 
to kill whales, and this will be discussed in further detail below. However, 
there are no questions about killing fish. The statement in the book saying that 
“Hardly anyone wants to protect the fish for their own sake. Everyone is 
interested in as much fish as possible” (Roll-Hansen 1993:286, my own 
translation) tries to sidestep an ethical discussion about killing fish. However, 
the discussion of whether it is morally OK to kill whales must also include 
other animals such as fish, who, like whales and humans, are sentient beings. 
In “Fiskenes ukjente liv” Bergljot Børresen reviews existing scientific 
knowledge about the brain capacity of fish, including their learning abilities 
and different social behaviours. She says that research on the behaviour of fish 
has convincingly documented that fish have a well-developed social 
intelligence. For example, the interaction between wrasses and their costumers 
is viewed as one of the highest developed communication systems between 
species that we know of (Børresen 2007:93). Børresen explains that the brain 
of all the fish's descendants on land, including humans', is in principle 
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inherited from fish as a “package-deal” with the same design (Børresen 
2007:11). Further, she states that the whole spectre of “human emotions”, 
including pain, hunger, appetite, disgust, curiosity, happiness, sorrow, safety, 
anxiety, anger, hatred, sexuality, intense love and even religious feelings 
originates from the oldest parts of the human brain – which is the part that is 
inherited from fish, and which all vertebrates have in common (Børresen 
2007:26). Newly conducted research also found that fish can show signs of 
depression in the way it is experienced by humans. “Salmon who experience 
stress over time have physiological changes and a behaviour that is not unlike 
the physiological changes and behaviour found with depressed human beings” 
(Forskning.no, my own translation). Fish should in no way be let out of the 
ethical discussion on how to treat other animals. Børresen says that because 
fish have such a different appearance than humans and are difficult to make 
personal contact with, they have been largely ignored when discussing their 
ethical status. For example is it difficult to make eye contact with a fish. 
“Almost nothing about the fish' appearance and behaviour can be a social 
trigger for a human. Fish have an extremely low “Bambi factor” and if they 
swim in herds, the actual amount becomes an additional problem” (Børresen 
2007:57, my own translation). However, the fact that fish seem highly 
different from us does not mean that humans should disclaim a discussion 
about the ethical consideration of fish – and especially now that we know that 
there are more similarities between us than many assume. By taking for 
granted that killing fish is morally OK, the burden of proof here lies with those 
who wish to give fish moral consideration and therefore do not think that more 
fish for the human fishing industry is a good argument for continuing whaling.  
 
In addition to taking for granted that it is morally OK to kill fish, the argument 
about killing whales so that we can kill more fish is similar to the thoughts of 
Aldo Leopold, before developing the land ethic. As a forester, Leopold viewed 
himself as a manager of the land, with the view that humans could control it as 
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they pleased. He started to hunt down wolves as he thought that less wolves 
meant more deer for humans to hunt - or in his own words “hunter's paradise”. 
In “Thinking Like a Mountain” Leopold reflects upon these thoughts and 
describes how he became aware of the interconnectedness of nature, and how 
humans, in his opinion, should not view themselves outside or above nature, 
controlling it as they please. As seen in part one of the thesis, an encounter 
with a dying wolf made him realise that controlling the wolf population like 
this was not the right thing to do, and after this deep experience he became 
aware of the destruction this caused the land. “I realized then, and have known 
ever since, that there was something new to me in those eyes – something only 
known to her and the mountain (Leopold 1949:1)”. Humans are too occupied 
with securing their own well-being to pay attention to what is really happening 
as a consequence. Leopold challenge us to think more like a mountain: 
I now suspect that just as a deer herd lives in mortal fear of its wolves, so does a 
mountain live in mortal fear of its deer. And perhaps with better cause, for while 
a buck pulled down by wolves can be replaced in two or three years, a range 
pulled down by too many deer may fail of replacement in as many decades. So 
also with cows. The cowman who cleans his range of wolves does not realize 
that he is taking over the wolf's job of trimming the herd to fit the range. He has 
not learned to think like a mountain. Hence we have dustbowls, and rivers 
washing the future into the sea (Leopold 1949:2). 
“Only the mountain has lived long enough to listen objectively to the howl of a 
wolf” (Leopold 1949:1). Whales, like wolves, are so-called keystone species 
in their ecosystems. A keystone species is “A species on which other species 
in an ecosystem largely depend, such that if it were removed the ecosystem 
would change drastically” (Oxford Dictionaries). Humans do not yet know 
how “managing” the minke whale populations affects the rest of the 
ecosystem, and as we have seen, research revealing that more whales may in 
fact may lead to more fish - the opposite of what was previously thought - 
shows that there are things humans do not understand about the 
interconnectedness of nature. Until we do (if we ever will), should not the 
precautionary principle be our first priority? Perhaps we should learn to think 
more like a mountain, or in this case, like the ocean? 
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Whaling is not less humane than the way we treat many other animals. 
(Or, is it OK to harm whales because other animals are harmed even 
worse? Is it right to kill other animals at all?) 
 
“Vågehvalen - valgets kval” presents several examples of how humans treat 
other animals worse than they treat minke whales. For example is it mentioned 
that animals in the modern farming industry live miserable lives compared to 
whales, who swim free their entire lives. Arguing against whaling while 
accepting how animals are treated in for example the farming industry is thus 
illogical. Therefore, the book states, if one still choses to argue against 
whaling it means that whales must be given a special status among the animals 
– perhaps even rights? This is however argued against, and it is highlighted 
numerous times that minke whales are not more special or more intelligent 
than many other non-human animals. In this way, “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” 
tries to convince the readers that it is arbitrary to argue against whaling 
because mistreatment of other animals is approved of. Again a burden of proof 
is defined, taking for granted that mistreatment of non-human animals, for 
example those in the farming industry, is morally OK. Instead of discussing 
why not all animals should be given intrinsic value (which implies that 
humans have to re-think their treatment of all of them), it is discussed why 
whales have gotten such a special status and why it is arbitrary to give whales 
the right to live when other non-human animals do not have this right. One 
may instead ask: Is it right to kill whales because other animals are treated 
worse? Should we not rather discuss moral consideration for all animals? And 
is it right to kill other animals at all?  
 
Arne Kalland presents his concept of “the super whale” in the book. He says 
that we often talk about the whale - the whale is the world's biggest animal, it 
has the largest brain in the world, it is social and friendly, it sings, it is 
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threatened to extinction, etc. These are characteristics that belong to different 
whale species, and to talk about the whale as one “super whale” is thus 
misleading, he says. Whales are also often perceived as mystical creatures as 
they live in the ocean and can be viewed as part mammal and part fish, which 
may reinforce this though of a “super whale” (Kalland 1993:188). Kalland 
thinks that this perception of the super whale is probably the reason why there 
has been such a large focus on the protection of whales compared to the 
protection of most other animals. Several pages of the book are spent to argue 
against this super whale view, and to assure the readers that minke whales in 
fact are not special at all in the animal kingdom. This is among other places 
illustrated in the chapter about minke whale biology, in a fact box about 
whales' intelligence: 
For most whales, as the minke whale, the brain is not particularly large 
compared to the size of its body, nor particularly complex. The brain of the blue 
whale is for example only six times as large as the human brain, while the 
whale's body is 15 times longer and 750 times heavier than humans'. The whales 
have in general, and minke whales in particular, a very small brain compared to 
its body size. It is not necessarily any correlation between intelligence and brain 
size, neither absolutely nor relatively. The brain size is, relatively speaking, 
much smaller for whales than for example for rats and mice. Further on, the 
brain structure itself is not very complex. Closer studies show that the whale 
brain is rather primitive and simple. Some of the characteristics found in more 
primitive mammals, like hedgehogs and bats, can also be found in whales. 
However, we do not find any of the characteristics we find in more advanced 
mammals, like primates, the group we belong to. What about the claimed large 
learning abilities of whales? First of all, not all whale species have abilities like 
these. The minke whale dos not. Dolphins have some of these learning abilities, 
but is probably unique among the whales. Second of all it is also many other 
animals – for example shepherd dogs, sea lions and parrots – who have the same 
kind of learning abilities without being ascribed any special higher intelligence 
for this reason. Whales are also often claimed to be a group with a complex and 
advanced social system. However, closer studies show that whales as a group do 
not have any unique social behaviours beyond what we find for example with 
moose and deer (Lid and Stenseth 1993:43, my own translation).  
First of all, to separate the brains of whales and primates (including humans) 
in this way, saying that no similar characteristics can be found, and to call the 
whale brain primitive and simple, is misleading. As written earlier, many of 
the characteristics that often are described as “human characteristics”, like 
happiness, sorrow, safety, anger, love, etc. are shared by all vertebrates. The 
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neocortex, which is the largest part of the human brain, was previously 
believed to be the driving seat for all these “human characteristics” because 
humans have a very large neocortex. However, scientists have found that these 
characteristics do not originate from the neocortex, but from the oldest parts of 
our brain, the part which all vertebrates share. Børresen calls this “the 
common brain”. What the neocortex does, is that it modifies the feelings that 
originate in the common brain. Often these feelings are curbed by the 
neocortex. Animals with a large neocortex are therefore able to curb and to 
control their feelings more than those with a small. Because of this, Børresen 
says, our common perceptions are turned upside down: The old assumption 
that a large neocortex equals intense feelings, must be replaced with the fact 
that the smaller it is, the more intense the feelings experienced may be. It is 
also worth mentioning that the neocortex is as good as useless without the 
common brain (Børresen 2007:24-31). Similar characteristics can therefore 
absolutely be found in all vertebrates, also mice, hedgehogs, parrots and other 
animals mentioned. Another misleading term used here is “primitive”. 
Børresen reminds us that the term “primitive” in biology does not mean 
“simple”, “stupid” or “rough”, even though it often is used to describe these 
characteristics. Rather, when using the word primitive to describe an animal, it 
means that this animal has many similarities with earlier or primordial links 
in the development chain. An example is the python snake, which is 
considered as more primitive than other snakes. This is because the remains of 
a pelvic bone and hind legs can be found in their skeletons, originating from 
the lizard-like animal all snakes have developed from. This does not mean that 
pythons are less intelligent than other snakes (Børresen 2007:25). Second of 
all, yet again a burden of proof is defined by those who only wish to include 
human beings inside the moral circle: It is taken for granted that because 
minke whales have the same brain-size ratio as rats and mice – and rats and 
mice are seen as unintelligent creatures – minke whales are argued as equally 
unintelligent. Because similar characteristics can be found in the brains of 
whales and in the brains of hedgehogs and bats – who are also assumed to be 
	  77	  
unintelligent - minke whales are argued as equally unintelligent. Because 
whales do not have any larger learning abilities than shepherd dogs, sea lions 
or parrots – which is not considered as a great learning capacity - minke 
whales are argued as equally unimpressive. Because whales do not have a 
more advanced social system than moose and deer – which is not considered 
as very sophisticated - minke whales are equally unsophisticated. Because all 
other living creatures are measured by our particularly human style of 
intelligence, this list of features presents whales as equally unimpressive and 
unintelligent as the rest of the animals mentioned, instead of equally 
impressive and intelligent. The possibility that there may be other forms of 
intelligence than our particularly human style of intelligence is not considered. 
As the saying goes: Everybody is a genius. But if you judge a fish by its 
ability to climb a tree, it will live its whole life believing that it is stupid. Also, 
the perceived biological superiority is here taken as a justification for moral 
consideration, yet another burden of proof defined.  
 
After emphasising that whales should not be perceived as more special or 
more intelligent than other non-human animals (giving the readers another 
incentive for not bothering to care about whale protection) “Vågehvalen – 
valgets kval” makes it clear that the way we treat many other animals is worse 
than the way we treat the minke whales. Sandøe for example highlights the 
(human caused) miserable lives of pigs and other animals in the meat industry: 
“It is worthwhile noting that pigs, cattle and other farmed animals are exposed 
to a significant amount of stress during transport, that often takes a whole day 
or half a day, and during handling in the slaughterhouses” (Sandøe 1993:159, 
my own translation). Sandøe continues by describing the stressful experiences 
of the animals in the slaughterhouses, including, but not limited to, being 
placed in large enclosures with strangers. He also mentions that most pigs, as 
an example, live in enclosures that in very limited ways can give the animals 
the possibility to unfold themselves freely. In many countries pigs spend most 
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of their lives in a very small space without the possibility to do other things 
than to lay down and stand up, Sandøe points out (Sandøe 1993:159). He also 
mentions hunting on land to illustrate another group of animals who are 
treated worse by humans that the whales. He says that a large percentage of 
the animals do not die momentarily when they are shot - a much larger 
percentage than in whaling. Many of the animals are harmed but not killed by 
the shots, he says, and they often run off never to be found. “Many of those 
will experience a slow and agonising death” (Sandøe 1993:160, my own 
translation).  
 
Further, Sandøe describes the unequal treatment of different species of 
animals as if it was a matter of course. For example, he says that because 
chimpanzees are more “highly developed” than other non-human animals, 
chimpanzees used for vivisection sometimes get a special treatment when they 
are no longer needed in the laboratories – they get a good “retirement”. He 
describes how a research institute in USA has created a pension fund for their 
chimpanzees, securing that their last years will be good ones. For example are 
some placed on islands uninhabited by humans, where they are fed regularly 
and where they can live until they die of natural causes. Animals belonging to 
other, “less developed”, species such as mice, rats and rabbits however, are 
killed when they are no longer of any use to us in the laboratories (Sandøe 
1993:158). Here Sandøe defines a burden of proof, by taking for granted that 
different species of animals should be given a different amount of moral 
consideration, and again, that all ought to be judged in comparison with the 
most “highly evolved” among them - ourselves. He does not question why it is 
OK to treat for example chimpanzees and mice in such different ways, nor 
does he question whether it is morally OK to use both what according to him 
are lower and higher developed non-human animals for vivisection at all.  
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Another burden of proof is defined by Sandøe when stating that there is 
nothing that indicates that whales are higher developed than for example pigs 
and cattle, so if one wishes to include whales in the moral circle, then one has 
to include several other species as well. Some do, he says, like Singer and 
Regan who are vegetarians. But after stating this, he ends the discussion. 
Thus, he takes for granted that all animals cannot be included in the moral 
circle and that vegetarianism is not an option for most people, by not 
bothering to discuss it any further. He is not asking any deeper questions, but 
concludes that because pigs and cattle are as intelligent (or perhaps in his 
words as little intelligent) as whales, and because most people do not view 
pigs and cattle as morally considerable, then whales cannot be morally 
considerable either. And because most people accept that pigs and cattle are 
treated badly, it must be accepted that whales are treated badly as well. In 
addition, as stated earlier, pigs and cattle are treated worse, he says. Instead of 
arguing who suffer the most – whales or pigs? - one can discuss whether it is 
morally ok to harm any of them at all. Why are pigs and cattle not morally 
considerable? When one starts asking deeper questions like these, the fact that 
other animals are treated worse than the minke whales becomes an arbitrary 
argument. It is also worth mentioning that there will always be others who are 
treated worse, also when speaking of humans. Should we for example accept 
poverty in Norway because the situation of poverty is worse in other parts of 
the world? Should we not strive for as little poverty as possible? Sandøe's 
argument can be compared to accepting poverty in Norway for the reason that 
poverty is worse other places – but without a call to discuss the ethical 
implications of and how one could better the situation of poverty in these other 
places. Whaling is OK because other animals are treated worse – but he does 
not challenge us to discuss the ethical implications of treating pigs badly in the 
farms or mice badly in the laboratories.  
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Even though Sandøe sidesteps an ethical discussion about the rights of the 
animals he mentions in his examples, like pigs and cattle, he does in fact 
discuss whale rights. This is one of the few places in the book where 
ecological ethics is used consciously when discussing, and whether whales 
should be assigned rights, like humans, is the main issue discussed regarding 
ethics in “Vågehvalen – valgets kval”. As we saw in part one, Tom Regan 
defines animal rights as “the prima facie right of individuals not to be harmed, 
and thus the prima facie right of individuals not to be killed” (Regan 2003:71). 
The main argument for defenders of whale rights, Sandøe says, is that whales 
are in many ways like humans and should therefore in the same way be given 
the right to a good life as well as the right to life itself. Whaling is of course 
not consistent with these potential rights, and must therefore be stopped. 
Sandøe says that when considering this argument, supporters of whaling have 
to find a relevant difference between humans and whales that explains why it 
is morally OK to take the life from whales but not from humans. What then, 
can this difference be? Sandøe presents different arguments: 
 
A difference in intelligence is one of these arguments, and as we have seen, 
throughout the book it is highlighted several times that whales are 
significantly less intelligent than humans. Sentences like “(...) whether whales 
– as the intelligent creatures they (wrongly) are claimed to be (...)” (Stenseth 
1993:325, my own translation) can be found, as well as quotation marks 
around the word intelligent when speaking of whale intelligence. “(...) myths 
about the whales' “intelligence” (…)” (Hoel et al. 1993C:146, my own 
translation). It is said that most whales, like the minke whales, do neither have 
a particularly large brain relative to their size nor a particularly complex one, 
but rather a quite primitive and simple brain (Lid and Stenseth 1993:43). And 
when speaking about whale communication, the word communication is also 
put in quotation marks as it cannot compare with the complexity of human 
communication (Lid and Stenseth 1993:41). Still, Sandøe says, even though 
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whales are not as intelligent as humans, this may not be a relevant argument 
for not giving whales any rights. He asks what this argument will imply for 
human infants, mentally impaired persons, etc., as they may be less 
“intelligent” than most whales. Should they not have any rights, then? Unless 
one agrees that they should not have rights, the intelligence argument is 
irrelevant for arguing that whales should not have rights.  
 
Another argument is that those who have rights must also have duties. No 
duties, no rights. Again, the same group of people as discussed in the last 
argument come into focus. Infants or mentally impaired persons do not have 
duties in the same way as other people. This does not mean that we do not 
think they should have any rights. In fact, Sandøe emphasises, many think that 
this group of people should be given even more ethical considerations and 
protection than others (Sandøe 1993:155). Why should this not include whales 
and others who do not have duties? In fact, many ethicists accept a distinction 
between moral agents and moral patients. Moral patients are beings whom we 
consider that we owe ethical obligations, and moral agents are beings who are 
held morally responsible for their actions. All moral agents are moral patients, 
but not all moral patients are moral agents (Light and Rolston III 2003:6). The 
most common example of moral patients who are not moral agents, Light and 
Rolston III says, are human infants and mentally impaired persons. “For 
example, we respect their rights as humans against torture (and codify this in 
law), even though we do not worry about how they exercise their rights or 
behave responsibly” (Light and Rolston III 2003:6). The argument saying that 
whales do not having duties is thus irrelevant as an explanation for why they 
are not given rights. 
 
Yet another argument is that humans have a mutual interest in cooperating, 
and that human rights and mutual respect between humans acts as a kind of 
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safety net for trusting others to do their part of the cooperation and respect you 
back. People respect others so that they in turn are respected by those others. 
If we transfer this argument, it means that we do not need to be respected by 
whales, so we do not have to respect them. This is an egoistic argument 
Sandøe says, and it still entails that a group of people - those whose 
cooperation and respect we can manage without - is left outside. “Those who 
think that other people are entitled moral consideration even though this does 
not serve their egoistic interests, cannot accept this reason for not giving rights 
to whales” (Sandøe 1993:156-157, my own translation).  
 
After discussing these arguments, Sandøe says that it is difficult to come to the 
conclusion that whales have no rights at all. However, he argues, most people 
will probably think that this discussion is rather black and white. Is it really a 
question between the right to live and not any rights at all? “To give whales 
the same rights as humans is taking it too far. On the other hand, it cannot be 
accepted that whales are inflicted with unnecessary suffering” (Sandøe 
1993:157, my own translation). But is it possible to argue for a middle-
statement, where whales to a certain extent have the right not to be inflicted 
with unnecessary suffering but do not have the right to live, like humans? Yes, 
Sandøe argues. Whales and humans have some things in common, for 
example the ability to suffer, which makes unnecessary harming of whales 
morally wrong, but there are also some main differences that makes killing 
them morally OK, he says. He claims for example that whales do not plan for 
the future and that they are not self-conscious. Even if these claims were true 
(which in light of scientific research among other places illustrated in the 
Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness is at least highly doubtful), there are 
still human beings without these capacities, and Sandøe once again compares 
their right to live with whales' right to live. What about people who cannot 
plan for the future or those who are not self-conscious? Do not heavily 
mentally impaired people or those who have very limited time left of their 
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lives have the right to live? They do, Sandøe says. However, this time he does 
not defend the whales right to the same moral consideration as this group of 
human beings. He acknowledge that the arguments saying that every human 
being has the right to live, not just those with a higher “intelligence”, the 
ability to plan for the future, those whose mutual respect we can manage 
without etc., may seem inadequate for many, as long as whales are not 
assigned the same right to live. “The way I see it, this is the price one has to 
pay for getting an intellectual satisfactory answer to what the relevant ethical 
difference between whales and humans is” (Sandøe 1993:157, my own 
translation). Thus, even though Sandøe claimed so, it does not seem like one 
can argue for a middle-statement like this from an ethical perspective. Sandøe 
obviously did not succeed in this task doing so, as he acknowledged that an 
insufficient answer “is the price one has to pay” to argue that is not morally 
OK to unnecessarily harm whales, but it is OK to take their lives. One might 
ask who has a legitimisation problem now?  
 
This is another example where a burden of proof is defined. Sandøe has 
already decided, before his discussion even started, that there is an ethical 
difference between humans and whales. However, Sandøe might have a point 
that there is a relevant difference between harming and killing. He is not alone 
among ethicists when claiming this. Peter Singer, even though advocating for 
veganism and thus opposing both the harming and killing of animals, 
emphasises that there in fact is a difference between harming someone and 
taking their life. His reasons for why it is morally wrong to unnecessary harm 
whales or other non-human animals are similar to Sandøe's: there are no 
relevant differences between humans and other sentient animals that makes it 
OK to harm them, just as it is not morally OK to harm human beings who for 
various reasons are “less intelligent”, who cannot plan for the future, who are 
not self-aware, etc. However, Singer says, “the wrongness of killing a being is 
more complicated” (Singer 2009:17). He says that while self-awareness, the 
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capacity to think ahead, to have hopes and aspirations for the future, to have 
meaningful relations with others and so on are not relevant to the question of 
inflicting pain (“since pain is pain, whatever other capacities, beyond the 
capacity to feel pain”), these capacities are relevant to the question of taking a 
life (Singer 2009:20). “It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware 
being, capable of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts 
of communication, and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being without 
these capacities” (Singer 2009:20). To illustrate this difference between 
inflicting pain and taking life, he asks us to consider how we would choose 
within our own species. If we had to chose between taking the life of an 
intellectually disabled person, who did not have the capacities mentioned 
above, and a “normal” human being, most people would chose to take the life 
of the former. However, if the question was pain, and one could only prevent 
pain from being inflicted to one of them, it is not so clear which one we would 
spare this pain. “The evil of pain is, in itself, unaffected by the other 
characteristics of the being who feels the pain; the value of life is affected by 
these other characteristics” (Singer 2009:20-21). But as mentioned in part one 
of the thesis, for Singer this does not mean that a human life always is valued 
higher than other animals' lives, as for example a healthy dog may have more 
of the mentioned characteristics than a heavily mentally impaired human. 
However, it is worth noting that his main point after discussing this is that this 
ethical discussion is only relevant if one must choose between two lives. If 
both the mentally impaired and the “normal” human can live, is this not the 
best solution? If both the mentally impaired human and the healthy dog can 
live, is this not the best solution? And if both the whale and the whaler can 
live, is this not the best solution? There are in fact very few situations in which 
one actually has to choose between lives like this. In Norway it is not the 
whale's lives or the lives of the whalers or the human consumers of whale 
meat. All can live. Sandøe's argument saying that there is an ethically relevant 
difference between inflicting unnecessary pain and taking lives is thus quite 
different from Singer's argument stating the same, as Sandøe does not take 
	  85	  
into account that taking lives is only morally OK if one has to choose. For this 
reason Sandøe's argument that there is an ethically relevant difference between 
unnecessary infliction of pain and killing is not relevant in the discussion of 
Norwegian whaling, according to Singer, as one does not have to choose. In 
his ethics chapter Sandøe also failed to explain why it is morally OK to take 
the life from a healthy whale and not a human being who is not self-conscious 
or able to plan for the future. As discussed in part one, according to Singer 
those in possession of capacities like these must always be chosen over those 
without, no matter what species they belong to. That is, if one has to choose.  
 
Further on, one can discuss what “unnecessary harm” means. Sandøe's 
conclusion that it is not morally OK to cause a whale unnecessary pain is in 
fact embodied in Norwegian law. The Animal Welfare Act (§ 3 General 
requirement regarding the treatment of animals) states that “Animals have an 
intrinsic value which is irrespective of the usable value they may have for 
man. Animals shall be treated well and be protected from danger of 
unnecessary stress and strains” (Animal Welfare Act). One needs not discuss 
the term intrinsic value any further to come to the conclusion that this has very 
little meaning in practice. Millions of animals are exploited, mistreated and 
killed each year in Norway for vivisection, entertainment, for their meat, eggs, 
milk, wool, fur, or for other purposes, exclusively because humans desire 
these products. “Intrinsic value” are little more than words on paper. But what 
does it imply that whales and other non-human animals have a right not to be 
caused unnecessary harm? In whaling, we know that with today's killing 
methods, the average time it takes a minke whale to die after being shot is 
(assumed to be) two minutes. These are two minutes of intense pain. 10% of 
the whales shot suffers for more than ten minutes before they die. When 
Sandøe wrote his chapter in “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” in 1993 the average 
time was even longer, as the harpoon grenade used today came into use in the 
year 2000. In addition one can ask: Is killing not a harm? And is harming 
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neccesarily worse than killing? For instance, killing another human is seen as 
a more serious crime than causing another human pain. Why is this different 
regarding non-human animals? And is killing whales really necessary? Is it 
necessary to kill other animals at all? “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” states that 
humans actually have to kill, and that there is no other choice if we wish to 
live:  
We humans need to kill other species – plants or other animals. They constitute 
our food. We must therefore take lives. In our culture that does not mean that 
we can kill other humans - no matter how mentally or physically challenged 
they may be. But we can kill all other species, unless it puts the future existence 
of the species in danger (Stenseth 1993:329, my own translation).  
As Curry emphasises, “an ecological ethics does not demand starvation” 
(Curry 2011:86). However, he makes it clear that “when pure survival is not 
the issue, nothing absolves individuals and communities of the ethical 
responsibility, when choice is still possible, to choose less rather than more 
destructive means” and when mass cruelty, highly sentient animals and 
endangered species are involved, “the killers must first be stopped” (Curry 
2011:83). Humans must kill, yes, but they do not have to kill sentient beings 
for food. Also, by eating animal products more plants are killed than by eating 
plant based food because the animals must be fed (often large amounts of) 
plants to produce meat, milk, and eggs. The book mentions the word 
vegetarianism a couple of times, but without any further discussion. Sandøe 
does not question this cultural “given” that it is OK to kill other sentient 
animals. Curry on the other hand does, and in his discussion about eating other 
animals he came to the conclusion that “Without any doubt, it [veganism] is 
the ethically most irreproachable position in relation to food and thence the 
major impact of humanity on other animals” (Curry 2011:89). Curry's 
statement will not be discussed any further here, but is is an important point to 
make that what Curry “without any doubt” sees as the most ethical solution is 
not even discussed as a serious option by Sandøe. This shows that the topic of 
food needs to be discussed in more detail, and as minke whales are being 
killed for their meat, it should be a central part of the whaling debate.  
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By emphasising that minke whales are not more intelligent or more special 
than many other animals, that many other animals are in fact treated worse by 
humans than the whales, and that humans have to kill other species, the 
authors of “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” tries to sidestep an ethical discussion 
about the intrinsic value of whales. However, when one does ask deeper 
questions about the intrinsic value of whales and other non-humans, the 
argument that whaling is OK because other animals are treated worse than 
whales becomes arbitrary. Not even Sandøe could find a relevant ethical 
difference between humans and whales explaining why it is morally OK to kill 
whales but not certain groups of human beings. And why does it matter that 
other animals are treated worse? Should we not strive for as little mistreatment 
as possible? This argument is also arbitrary if one does not agree that treating 
a human being bad is OK because other human beings are treated worse. 
 
As long as we manage the “resource” whale sustainably, we can continue 
whaling. (Or, is it OK to harm minke whales because they do not belong 
to an endangered species? Is it OK to describe whales as resources?) 
 
If you could ask the respectfully and sustainably hunted animal whether it 
minded being killed, it would almost certainly say, 'Yes!' (Curry 2011:86-87).  
 
The third and final main argument for catching minke whales in “Vågehvalen 
– valgets kval” that will be discussed is that, because the minke whale is not 
an endangered species and that strict hunting quotas are set, whaling is a 
sustainable way of managing our resources. A lot of pages are spent on 
explaining how the counting of the North-East Atlantic minke whale 
population was conducted and it is ensured that the population today is large 
enough to continue whaling, without any risk of threatening it. If the minke 
whale was a threatened species of whale, hunting it would not be an option 
	  88	  
and Norwegian commercial whaling would not exist today. As Stenseth 
writes, “(...) we can kill all other species, unless it puts the future existence of 
the species in danger” (Stenseth 1993:329, my own translation). As seen when 
discussing the argument about fish, humans do not yet know enough about the 
ocean as an ecosystem to with certainty say that the Norwegian whaling is 
sustainable or how it might affect the ecosystem. However, the argument 
stating that whales and other more-than-human nature are “our resources”, as 
the book does with whales, fish and other non-human animals - both entire 
species and the individuals they consist of - as well as the sea as an ecosystem, 
also need at thorough ethical discussion, as it is highly anthropocentric. By 
“our” it is clearly meant us humans, not us animals, or us earthlings. However 
it is not seen as morally OK to drive a species to extinction. Does this focus on 
protecting the mine whale as a species mean that the authors of the book are 
moving towards a more ecocentric position after all? 
 
Throughout the book the minke whale is primarily described as a resource. 
“The minke whale is a common resource in the sense that no single person, 
group of persons, country or group of countries have exclusive rights to 
exploit them (Hoel et al. 1993A:17, my own translation). This sentence 
initiates the preface of the book. On the first page of the introduction chapter, 
the word resource is mentioned as many as 13 times. On this page it is for 
example stated that “whales are natural resources that travels over vast areas” 
(Hoel and Stenseth 1993:19). The chapter “About Non-Consuming Use-Value 
of Whale Populations” highlights that the whales should be perceived mainly 
as a resource. The author, Leif Longva, presents some of the different ways in 
which whales can be used by humans, by creating different categories of use-
value. First, he makes a distinction between use-value and non-use-value. His 
interpretation of non-use-value will be discussed in more detail later. The 
category use-value is divided into three categories: consuming use-value, 
indirect use-value and non-consuming use-value. Whaling is the best example 
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of consuming use-value. Whale products, today mainly the meat, are directly 
consumed by humans. Examples of indirect use-value of whales can be 
listening to records with sound recordings of whales, or watching 
documentaries about them on television. Whales can also be used indirectly as 
a sales promoting object, for example as a symbol in a logo. Longva also 
mentions that the way minke whales eat make them an object of (a negative) 
indirect use-value, as they eat species of fish that are of direct use-value for 
humans. Non-consuming use-value of whales can be whale watching, 
swimming with dolphins, watching shows at aquariums, etc. Longva discusses 
whale watching in more detail: “Whale watching gives people the opportunity 
to observe whales who swim free in the ocean. However, not all whale species 
are exciting to look at. The minke whale is not suitable as an object for whale 
watching” (Longva 1993:108, my own translation). Longva says that the 
minke whale is relatively small, and it is not as playful near the surface as 
some of the other whale species. After stating this, he uses the humpback 
whale as a contrast to describe what a spectacular experience whale watching 
can be. He highlights, among other things, its huge size and long pectoral fins, 
its playfulness near the surface, its sense of curiosity, as well as its “goodbye-
wave” to the audience when it waves its tail, making the final dive before it 
disappears. The main attraction for whale watching in Norway (mainly 
conducted from Andøya in Nordland) is sperm whales as well as killer whales 
who are sighted often. Fin whales, blue whales and humpback whales may 
also be spotted if one is lucky. “Minke whales are not a rare sight, but they are 
like mentioned earlier not very audience friendly” (Longva 1993:109, my own 
translation). Thus, according to Longva, the non-consuming use-value of 
whales found in whale watching does not include minke whales, and this non-
consuming use-value of minke whales cannot compete with the use-value 
whaling. Others have a rather different opinion: Hoelzen and Stern says that in 
Iceland and in the Herbrides in Scotland, minke whales are the main event for 
whale watchers. In these areas minke whales are relatively abundant, and the 
whale watching boats therefore have a good chance at finding them. “Minkes 
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seem to be naturally curious, and will often approach a boat for a look, and 
may even bow-ride. (…) they sometimes approach and remain with a boat for 
hours, gently rolling and hovering just below the surface” (Hoelzen and Stern 
2000:37). At the end of his chapter about use-value, Longva presents yet 
another way in which whales can be used by humans. He says that there exists 
a certain demand for memberships in or the ability to donate money to 
organisations to make us feel better about ourselves, for example organisations 
who work for the protection of whales and an end to whaling. Research shows 
that being a member of organisations like these gives us a “warm and nice 
feeling”, Longva says. Whaling thus creates the possibility for joining an 
organisation like this, an action that gives a warm and nice feeling for those 
who buy it. “In other words, a moderate whaling may be better than no 
whaling for supporters as well as opponents!” (Longva 1993:123, my own 
translation). It would be interesting to see this argument being used for 
advocating for more pollution or more hunger. Is the warm and nice feeling a 
membership or a donation to for example UNICEF gives really more 
important for those who donate, than the cause they are donating to? Should 
we not aim to eradicate world hunger or stop the deforestation of the Amazon 
because being able to donate to organisations working for these causes is of 
more value to us? However, the most important discussion here is not whether 
minke whales are boring to look at or not or whether donating money to a 
whale protecting organisation is of more value to us than ending whaling. 
Rather, the discussion should be focused on why there is a need for them to 
have some kind of use-value for humans to be valued at all - whether this 
additional burden of proof ought to be accepted or not. 
As we have seen, it is taken for granted that it is not morally OK to hunt a 
species to extinction. Does this mean that the authors are moving away from 
their anthropocentric standpoint after all? As discussed in part one of the 
thesis, there is a discussion within ecological ethics whether individuals, 
species or ecosystems should be given priority when it comes to moral 
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consideration. Do the authors of “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” advocate for 
species as most important when it comes to moral consideration? “An 
advocate for this version of an environmental ethic could argue that the rare 
and endangered species ought to be preserved because natural species are the 
primary recipients of moral obligation” (Katz 2003:88). But to consider 
species as the primary object of moral concern is difficult to defend. What 
kind of arguments can this be based on? It does not ensure the well-being of 
individuals nor does it provide direct reasons for protecting ecosystems or the 
natural objects who form their material structure (Katz 2003:88). Katz states 
that this view is basically incompatible with animal liberation, because when 
the well-being and survival of species is the primary moral concern, the pain 
or death of an individual member of that specis is of secondary impoirtance. 
“It may be necessary, for example, to manage or “harvest” an animal species 
that is overpopulating an area and threatening its own food supply” (Katz 
2003:88). Neither does protection of species automatically lead to the 
protection of ecosystems. What about species who only exist in captivity? Or 
those who have so few individuals left that they no longer have any relevant 
function in their ecosystems? What are the incentives for protecting those 
species? Joel Feinberg discounts species entirely as the proper object of direct 
moral concern. “A whole collection, as such, cannot have beliefs, 
expectations, wants, or desires... Individual elephants can have interests, but 
the species elephant cannot” (Feinberg in Katz 2003:88). Katz does not 
discount the view entirely as Feinberg does, but he does find it difficult to 
argue for it. “In itself, a species-based environmental ethic seems to be an 
uneasy, groundless compromise between the broad view that the natural 
community is the environmentally appropriate moral object and the narrow 
view that natural individuals are themselves the bearers of moral worth” (Katz 
2003:89). It seems difficult to find relevant arguments for valuing a species 
more than the individuals it consists of or the ecosystem it is a part of. 
However, it does not seem like the authors of the book advocate for this kind 
of intrinsic value of species. In the same way the authors describe the 
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individual whales and the ecosystem they live in as human's resources, their 
incentive for protecting the species minke whale also seems to be 
anthropocentric: “If the pelagic whaling in its time had driven for example the 
bowhead whale extinct, many or most people would consider this a loss. This 
would be a loss of current as well as future use of this resource” (Longva 
1993:118, my own translation). In addition, he says, one could feel a loss of 
well-being by the thought that such a huge and beautiful animal was gone 
forever and by the thought that the diversity of nature had been reduced” 
(Longva 1993:118). We must manage the whales sustainably, “so that whale 
can be an eternal renewable resource” (Schweder 1993:291). The reason for 
protecting the species is thus that this ensures further use of it as a resource 
and that humans may feel a loss of well-being by the thought of a whale 
species as extinct. As Myers puts it: “If species can prove their worth through 
their contributions to agriculture, technology, and other down-to-earth 
activities, they can stake a strong claim to survival space in a crowded world” 
(Myers in Gorke 2003:137). The continued and widespread focus on 
sustainable whaling and the incentives for protecting the minke whale as a 
species are thus anthropocentric. Sandøe confirms that “The modern 
discussion about whaling is based on the view that the whale is a resource that 
can be exploited by humans” (Sandøe 1993:161, my own translation). This 
implies that the discussion starts from the presumption that minke whales are 
resources and do not have intrinsic value – it defines a burden of proof. 
 
However, both Longva and Sandøe are aware that there is a discussion of 
whether intrinsic value can be found in more-than-human nature, and this is in 
fact discussed briefly in “Vågehvalen – valgets kval”. Together with the 
discussion about whale rights, Longva's and Sandøe's brief discussions about 
intrinsic value in more-than-human nature are the only places in the book 
where ecological ethics is consciously used to frame an argument. Although, 
Longva's piece about non-use-value can be argued to not really be a 
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discussion. He describes what intrinsic value is, and mentions Singer. He also 
tries to make a case against the intrinsic value of other animals by quoting 
Næss, saying that Næss argues that those who are closer to us are more 
important than those who are not: “To prioritise the creatures who are close to 
us, is as far as I can understand, the only or the best reason to prioritise help to 
humans and cultures in need before help to animals. It is also a reason for 
killing animals and in other ways place them “last in line” (Næss in Longva 
1993:119, my own translation). First of all, Næss did only say that it is OK to 
prioritise humans over other animals when these humans are in need. Are the 
whalers and the consumers of whale meat in Norway really in need? Second 
of all, this was Longva's only argument. He states that this is a philosophically 
interesting debate, but does not investigate it any further. Sandøe discusses 
intrinsic value in nature in more detail than Longva, but still not thoroughly. 
And it seems as though he, as Longva, has already decided what the answer 
will be before starting the discussion. He starts by saying that there are some 
who argue that there is intrinsic value in all of nature. “This is a tempting way 
of thinking” Sandøe continues, but he highlights what he describes as some 
main flaws in this view. First of all, he says that it is possible to argue for 
moral consideration of non-human animals, but not further like Singer and 
Regan do. Non-conscious natural entities have no interests, he states. As seen 
in part one, far from everyone agrees with this statement, and therefore it is 
problematic to state it straightforwardly as a fact. However Sandøe does not 
discuss this any further. It has also been made clear by now that he is not an 
advocate for the intrinsic value of conscious animals, so this statement does 
not make a strong case. Further he states that an ethic giving intrinsic value to 
all of nature is so comprehensive that it becomes futile. If everything in nature 
has intrinsic value, then how can we live without doing anything that is 
morally wrong? We cannot harvest grains or take medicine when having an 
infection. How should we prioritise? He says that those arguing for a such a 
view say that if one has to prioritise, then original species must come first. 
Whales, for example, have been present on Earth longer than human beings, 
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and so therefore whales should be prioritised over humans. This is not a strong 
argument, Sandøe says, as species continually evolve and also because of the 
fact that many species are older than whales, for example xiposuras. Does this 
mean that xiphosuras should be given more moral concern than whales? “All 
opponents of whaling would presumably answer no to this question” (Sandøe 
1993:163-164, my own translation). This is the only alternative to prioritising 
he mentions. As we have seen in part one, there are a lot of suggestions as to 
how one could prioritise and live in accordance with an ecocentric ethics. 
Katz, for example, came to the conclusion that ecosystems should be the top 
priority, but that individuals also are of great importance, and should only give 
way for the greater good of the ecosystem if really necessary. Næss speaks of 
vital needs, and both harvesting grains (to eat) and taking medicine to alleviate 
sickness are to cover vital needs. Moral pluralism could also be a solution for 
Sandøe. As seen in part one, the goal for those who support moral pluralism is 
not to forward and defend a single overarching ethical principle, but to use the 
different principles of ecological ethics to discuss the best solutions for 
different situations. It is also important to emphasise that ecological ethics is 
not meant to replace traditional human-centred ethics, which, Curry says, “has 
a legitimate and important role in intra-human relationships. The point is, 
rather, that adding something new will enable an ethical behaviour that a more 
anthropocentric ethic cannot, on its own, accomplish” (Curry 2011:7). Sandøe 
has concluded that giving all of nature intrinsic value is impossible, without 
even discussing the views of different ecological ethicists. If Sandøe had used 
the field of ecological ethics as a platform for his discussion, familiarising 
himself with some of the different views, for example those presented in part 
one of this thesis (which, as I have mentioned before, do represent a good 
overview of the field, but are far from exhaustive) perhaps he would have 
come up with a different conclusion?  
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Although failing in their attempt to make a case against both whale rights and 
against the intrinsic value of more-than-human nature, the authors of 
“Vågehvalen – valgets kval” are not open to consider the minke whale as 
anything other than a human resource. The reasons for the continued focus on 
sustainable whaling and not threatening the species are all anthropocentric. As 
seen in part one of the thesis, Næss argues that no natural object or life-form 
must be conceived solely as a resource. He says that we should ask ourselves 
why we use resources and whether or not we need this particular resource to 
live meaningful lives. He also emphasises that humans may not be the only 
ones who desire this resource. Are we the ones who need it the most? Næss 
argues that there are two different profound views or attitudes towards 
whaling. The first is that humans have no right to bring other species to 
extinction, but they do have a right to kill other living beings as long as a risk 
of extinction is not a threat. When extinction is not a threat, and it is 
commercially favourable to “harvest”, this is a good enough reason to do so. It 
can even be seen as a political duty, to create jobs. This is clearly the view of 
the authors of “Vågehvalen – valets kval” and most others who are pro-
whaling. The second view is that humans do not have the right to decrease the 
richness and diversity of live forms, except to satisfy vital needs. Every living 
being has intrinsic value, a value independent of its use-value for humans 
(Næss 1992:1). “I am against whaling, not because extinction is a possibility, 
nor because the whale has a unique position among mammals” (Næss 1992:3, 
my own translation). To find reasons for being against whaling, he challenges 
us to think through, once more, our profound view on the nature/human 
relationship (Næss 1992:3).  
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A legitimisation problem? 
 
“Vågehvalen – valgets kval” argues that those who use ecological ethics as an 
arena to negotiate different arguments against whaling have a legitimisation 
problem (Sandøe 1993:151). However, as we saw in his discussion about 
whale rights, Sandøe himself was the one who ended up with a legitimisation 
problem, as he came to the conclusion that an insufficient answer is “the price 
one has to pay” to continue defending that killing minke whales is ethically 
right. In the introduction of his ethics chapter it is not only mentioned that 
those who use ecological ethics to argue against whaling have a legitimisation 
problem, but it is also stated that including a chapter about ethics in the book 
was something the editors did to avoid critique, not because they saw it as 
important. Because those against whaling often use ethical arguments, they 
say, the defenders of whaling need to answer. “If the defenders of whaling do 
not try to answer the ethical arguments, they may soon appear as though they 
do not care at all about what is right” (Sandøe 1993:151, my own translation). 
Hence, the reason for the editors of the book to include a chapter about ethics 
was not because it was of any real importance to them. It seems to me, 
therefore, that the claimed legitimisation problem does not lie with those who 
argue for the intrinsic value of whales (when using ecological ethics 
consciously), because Sandøe, in fact, accepted that his answer was 
insufficient. However, according to Sandøe, the problem lies with those who 
argue that ecological ethics should be an important part of the debate in the 
first place. The remaining question is then: Why are those who think that 
ecological ethics should be an important part of the debate when discussing 
issues regarding more-than-human nature, and consciously use ecological 
ethics as a platform when arguing, considered to have a legitimisation 
problem? 
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First it is worth mentioning that those who argue for whaling, including the 
authors of “Vågehvalen – valgets kval”, themselves are using ethics when they 
discuss. As Curry simply puts it: “relationships between subjects entail ethics” 
(Curry 2011:3). Their arguments are therefore not “unethical” in the sense that 
ethics is missing. On the contrary, they are situated with a particular kind of 
ethics that according to Curry is not only “ecologically pathological” but also 
largely unconscious (Curry 2011:11). Perhaps the editors of the book and 
others mentioned in the thesis, like Borten Moe, are not aware that they 
themselves represent certain kinds of ethical views when they present their 
arguments, while at the same time not accepting other arguments based on 
ethics? The discussion about whaling is a discussion about the relationships 
between humans and minke whales, which also affects fish and other animals 
and plants, as well as species and ecosystems – and relationships between 
subjects entail ethics. For this reason, it might not be the case that those who 
argue for continuing whaling in this debate do not use ethics in their 
arguments, but perhaps they are not be aware of it. They might use it 
unconsciously, as Curry said. For example, by describing the dive of a 
humpback whale as a “goodbye-wave”, the book itself gives “human 
characteristics” to other animals, while at the same time critiquing those who 
oppose whaling when doing the same. It is also worth remembering that 
anthropocentrism is an ethical view. All people represent certain ethical views 
when discussing, also anthropocentric and “objective” scientists. Joseph R. 
Des Jardins emphasises that when leaving environmental decisions to 
“experts” in science and technology this does not mean that the descisions 
made will be objective or value nautral. “It means only that the values and 
philosophical assumptions that do decide the issue will be those that these 
experts hold” (Des Jardins in Curry 2011:10). So when their own arguments 
represent certain ethical views, how come they refrain from using the term 
ecological ethics consciously and to encourage people to use it as a platform to 
discuss whaling? Why do they make fun of those who consciously use 
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ecological ethics when arguing against whaling and state that they have a 
legitimisation problem and use feelings instead of knowledge? 
 
In her chapter “Out of the Straitjacket” Børresen writes about how the focus 
on “objectiveness” and the fear of giving into feelings causes problems when 
researching for example the behaviour of non-human animals. The problem is, 
she says, that the researchers distance themselves so far from those who are 
researched that it blocks their ability to perceive reality. When scientists view 
themselves as “objective”, rational and unaffected by their feelings, the 
emotional distance to the animal studied will make them as good as blind. 
Most of the behaviours and attributes of the animals are often overlooked 
under these circumstances (Børresen 2007:49). To distance themselves from 
their subjects of research scientists have for example adapted the habit of 
using numbers instead of names for the animals, and to speak of “it” instead of 
her or him (Børresen 2007:52). To clearly separate between the human 
researcher and the non-human animal studied has been the norm in scientific 
research, Børresen says. She calls this “the taboo of anthropomorphism” 
(Børresen 2007:54). However, she continues, this taboo has finally started to 
disappear. She quotes a scientist who for a long time experienced this “fear” 
of anthropomorphism when studying birds:  
Because I earlier had accepted the official scientific view that birds are robots 
controlled by instincts, I was terrified when I realised that this official taboo 
against anthropomorphism had blocked me and practically all other scientists 
against perceiving the reality, and hence our closest neighbours, the birds', 
intelligent nature (Barber in Børresen 2007:54, my own translation).  
Børresen highlights the importance of so-called “theocentric research”, as 
opposed to anthropocentric research. Anthropocentric researchers are people 
who in their fear of anthropomorphism demand that the non-human animals 
they study must show mimicry, language, behaviour and problem solving that 
is entirely like humans', if they are to be accepted as more than robots. As a 
contrast, a researcher who tries to perceive the world from the point of view of 
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the animals studied can be called a theocentric researcher. This has nothing to 
do with sentimentality, Børresen emphasises. Rather, it is based on knowledge 
of the animal species' unique sensing and moving capacities, its development 
history, and what we already know about animal behaviour, motives and 
intelligence (Børresen 2007:55). A good example to illustrate how this focus 
on objectiveness and fear of anthropomorphism has weakened research is the 
study of sexual behaviour of female rats. The common research method for 
hundred years had been to put a female rat in a cage, letting one or more male 
rats into the cage and then observe the behaviour. When one male is let in, the 
female tilts up her tail and signal herself as ready for mating. If two or more 
males are let into the cage, a little or a lot of fighting may occur before she 
signals herself as ready for one of them, or perhaps even two of them. The 
more males let into the cage, the more “behaviour” the scientists can describe. 
In addition, they can castrate, give hormones or otherwise influence their 
brains which may make their behaviour different. Because of these results, the 
sexual behaviour of female rats has for a long time been considered as a 
simple affair. However, this view changed when a female researcher 
experienced empathy with the female rat and asked herself: perhaps a female 
rat under natural conditions, not in a small cage like this, do not just behave as 
a passive recipient and a “mating machine”? A miniature “rat world” was 
built, with several square meters of rocks, straws, pathways and hiding places. 
After making herself familiar in her new world, she greeted the first male she 
was introduced to with a playful attitude, jumping and running around. The 
male had to follow her into her territory and then make himself presentable. 
Suddenly the female rat had a large variety of “behaviour” to show the 
researchers. She mated with some of the males she was introduced to, but not 
all of them. Some of them were even chased away, and it was discovered that 
rats are selective when they choose a father for their children. This revealed 
that what the scientists had been studying for hundred years was not the sexual 
behaviour of female rats, but the behaviour of female rats getting raped 
(Børresen 2007:50). The scientifically correct result was uncovered because a 
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scientist gave into her feelings, and tried to perceive the world from the view 
of the rats.  
 
Børresen argues that human beings are probably the only animal with the 
ability to empathise with and have an understanding for what it is like to be 
another species. “This means that those who hold tight onto the old 
anthropocentric standpoint are blocking themselves from developing what 
perhaps is the only thing that is special about humans” (Børresen 2007:56, my 
own translation). To move from an anthropocentric to a theocentric attitude, 
and to allow room for feelings and ecological ethics is not only important 
when conducting research, but also when discussing issues about more-than-
human nature. As Stephen Jay Gould emphasises: “we cannot win this battle 
to save species and environments without forging an emotional bond between 
ourselves and nature as well – for we will not fight to save what we do not 
love” (Gould in Curry 2011:5). Why this negative focus on arguments based 
on feelings? In the book “Ecology, community and lifestyle – outline of an 
ecosophy” Arne Næss defends the importance of feelings, and emphasises 
how important our subjective experiences are. He addresses the problems of 
ontology - “what there is” - and challenges the contemporary “near monopoly 
of the co-called scientific world view” (Næss 1989:35). He makes an attempt 
to “defend our spontaneous, rich, seemingly contradictory experience of 
nature as more than subjective impressions”, as “They make up the concrete 
contents of our world” (Næss 1989:35). David Rothenberg, introducing this 
edition of Næss' book, emphasises that intuitions and emotional views like 
these are an integral component of objective reality and that they therefore 
deserves serious consideration in debates (Rothenberg in Næss 1989:14), and 
that “the feelings of oneness which we can learn to feel in/with nature actually 
exists in nature, and are as real as any quantifiable environment that can be the 
subject to cost-benefit analysis” (Rothenberg in Næss 1989:20). As Næss 
points out, science can never uncover values (Næss 1989:40), and values are 
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needed when deciding how to act. The belief that science and rational 
knowledge about nature is enough to derive conclusions about what to do 
must be challenged, because “we cannot act without norms!” (Næss 1989:41). 
As an example, Næss writes that if a factory is shut down and moved to 
another location because of waterway pollution, we accept, in addition to the 
scientific hypotheses about the effects of this waterway pollution, evaluations 
that are not part of any science: for example that waterways ought not to be 
poisoned (Næss 1989:41). Science and rational knowledge alone cannot help 
us to decide how to live and act – ethics is needed.  
Feelings and subjective experiences are important, not only because they may 
help us to uncover more correct scientific results or because they are needed to 
decide what to do with these scientific results, but also because they make up 
the concrete “objective” world. They are as real as science. In scientific 
research the taboo of anthropomorphism is slowly declining according to 
Børresen. But in the public debate about whaling and other issues involving 
non-humans we have seen that it is still present. Ecological ethics is not 
encouraged, or often not even “accepted”, to be used as a platform when 
discussing issues regarding more-than-human nature. Why are the defenders 
of whaling avoiding arguments based on feelings and subjective experiences, 
refusing to admit that they are as real and as important as science, and to 
admitting that they are using it themselves? Is it because those who perceive 
the world from an anthropocentric standpoint are afraid of what a thorough 
ethical discussion about more-than-human nature might imply - of the 
consequences of asking deeper questions about our relationship with the rest 
of nature? Rothenberg says that “One should never limit the bounds of the 
problem just to make an easier solution acceptable” (Rothenberg in Næss 
1989:12). We saw earlier that Ola Borten Moe says that he is afraid of the 
consequences ending fur farming might imply, as other ways of exploiting 
non-human animals then will probably be questioned as well, including his 
chicken farm. It is easier for him to defend fur farming to prevent a deeper 
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discussion about other species of non-human animals, for example by making 
fun of those who use ecological ethics when arguing against fur farming by 
saying that they have a Walt Disney-like view of animals and that they base 
their arguments on feelings instead of knowledge when they argue. Do the 
government and others think the same way about whaling, and what a 
thorough ethical discussion about whaling might imply? Would we have to 
stop whaling? And would we also then have to stop hurting other marine 
mammals? All mammals? All sentient animals, including the environment 
they live in? What about non-animal nature? An ethical discussion including 
deeper questions about our relationship with more-than-human nature may 
occur if the government encouraged using ecological ethics as a platform 
when discussing whaling. And some of the answers one would get as a result 
might force most people to change their practices drastically to live in 
accordance with these answers. Is this the reason why they try to tie down the 
ethical discussion about whaling? 
 
Siri Martinsen makes a connection between the lack of acceptance for ethical 
arguments in the whaling debate in the early 1990's and the reason why there 
is still such a low awareness of ecological ethics in most public debates in 
Norway today regarding non-human animals. In her chapter about Norwegian 
whaling and seal hunting in the book “Hvem er villest i landet her?” Martinsen 
mentions “Vågehvalen - valgets kval” and its arguments as a good example of 
how the debate took place. She confirms that critique of whaling based on 
ecological ethics was described as (illegitimate) “feelings” by the pro-whaling 
side, and that those who argued with arguments based on these “feelings” 
were said to have no knowledge, no understanding, etc. (Martinsen 2013). She 
argues that this, at times, quite aggressive political promotion of whaling, and 
mission to label those using ecological ethics when arguing as ignorant etc. 
may have weakened the development of an ethical debate concerning other 
animals in Norway (Martinsen 2013:111). When reflecting upon this negative 
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focus on arguments based on feelings, Martinsen challenges us to think about 
what kind of feelings these arguments are based on – they are based on 
empathy and compassion. “And since when was it considered as a virtue not 
to be empathic and not to be compassionate?” (Martinsen interview 
09.04.2014, my own translation). Human beings without these feelings intact 
are even considered as dangerous, as they might hurt other human beings, she 
says. Why do these feelings become “illegitimate” when those we feel 
empathy with or compassion for are non-humans? Martinsen also points out, 
like discussed above, that the arguments of those who wish to continue 
whaling are also based on feelings and present certain ethical views and 
values. She mentions emotions such as the feeling of national pride and the 
feeling of nostalgia, and values such as keeping traditions and valuing money 
more than valuing lives. However, as a veterinarian, she also emphasises the 
importance of scientific research and using arguments based on facts when 
debating. It is a fact that minke whales have the ability to feel pain like us, and 
an interest to live a good life without experiencing pain like us, she says. 
These are facts and are not up for discussion. However, they must be included 
as a central part of the debate about whaling: The facts are on the table, and 
now we have to discuss what these facts should imply ethically. “Is it OK to 
inflict pain and to kill whales, when they have an interest to live and to not 
experience pain, like humans?” (Martinsen interview 09.04.2014, my own 
translation). Concerning the claimed legitimisation problem Martinsen argues 
that this is not a valid statement – it is the same as saying “you are wrong” 
without giving any reasons why. Instead of answering the ethical arguments 
thoroughly and accepting that ethics should be a central part of the debate, 
they name-call and make fun of those who do so (for example by using the 
words ignorant, Disney, legitimisation problem, feelings instead of 
knowledge, etc.). This creates a toxic culture around the debate, she says. But 
it also illustrates that those who claim so have run out of relevant arguments to 
defend their view (Martinsen interview 09.04.2014). In addition, statements 
like these from government representatives and other important people are 
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very unfortunate, she says, and as we have seen she thinks that “Vågehvalen – 
valgets kval” and the views it still represents may have made the development 
of the ethical discussion about non-humans in Norway more difficult. Still one 
is met with the same arguments, and still one experiences being made fun of 
when arguing against whaling by consciously using ecological ethics. 
However, as a central character in the ethical debate about non-human animals 
in Norway, Martinsen can confirm that it has become more and more accepted 
with ethical arguments since “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” was published and 
the debate about whaling was at its greatest, especially when they derive from 
scientific results about the animals. This is not only evident when discussing 
whaling, but also issues involving other sentient animals. However, there is 
still a long way to go before the scientific results revealing the physical and 
emotional feelings of other animals can be thoroughly discussed ethically in 
the public debate, she predicts (Martinsen interview 09.04.2014).  
 
This previous section has discussed the claimed legitimisation problem of 
those who consciously use ecological ethics when discussing whaling. Is has 
been revealed that those who claim this are themselves using arguments based 
on feelings and represent certain ethical values, and that they do not 
acknowledge the importance of so-called theocentric research for achieving 
the most correct results, by stating that feelings and rational knowledge are 
opponents. Further on, they do not acknowledge that feelings and subjective 
experiences also make up the concrete “objective” world and are as real as 
science. When actively using scientific results, for example that whales are 
self-conscious, then the treatment of them has to be reconsidered. However, 
science alone can never tell us how we ought to live and act in relation to 
anyone or anything. Therefore it does not make any sense to make such a clear 
distinction between feelings and knowledge. In addition, when actually 
discussing ethics consciously in “Vågehvalen – valgets kval”, it is not 
discussed thoroughly, and an insufficient answer was considered as “the price 
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one has to pay” to get a satisfactory answer for arguing that continuing 
whaling is morally OK. It seems fair to conclude that the authors of the book 
had already decided what the answer should be (i.e., whaling is good), and 
constructed their ethical discussion according to this. The government still 
operates with their focus on “lack of knowledge”, stating that “Still a lack of 
scientific knowledge is experienced as a challenge for the Norwegian 
government, not just within the IWC, but also when marine mammals are 
discussed in several other contexts” (regjeringen.no:B, my own translation). 
However, they speak of this lack of knowledge while at the same time 
presenting uncertain knowledge as facts, and omitting other knowledge that 
might render their premeditated position problematic. The argument about 
how whaling equals more fish is a good example of this. At the same time 
they represent what according to Børresen are outdated views about the 
relationship between knowledge and feelings. How come the government and 
others representing the pro-whaling views discussed in part two of this thesis 
omit all of the points uncovered in this section? It certainly seems like they try 
to steer clear of the ramifications of using this broader frame of ecological 
ethics as a platform for discussing the issue of whaling: Deeper questions and 
a thorough discussion about how we should live and act in relationship with 
other sentient animals and what this should imply. And perhaps some would 
start asking questions about more-than-human nature as well? It is more 
convenient to sidestep this ethical discussion and continue business-as-usual. 
But is this really the way we wish to proceed?  
 
Reversing the burden of proof  
 
According to the authors of “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” those who are 
against whaling have to prove why this practice is wrong by giving good 
reasons for why more whales does not result in less fish for humans to catch, 
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why whaling is less humane than other ways of exploiting non-human 
animals, and why whaling is not a sustainable way of managing our resources. 
Furthermore, the book states that those who attempt to do so by grounding 
their arguments in ecological ethics have a legitimisation problem, as they do 
so because they fail to find good counterarguments to the “proofs” the book is 
presenting. A burden of proof thus lies not only with those who are against 
whaling, but with those who do not perceive the world from an 
anthropocentric standpoint. 
 
Throughout the chapter about ecological ethics and Norwegian whaling we 
have seen that a burden of proof is defined several times by the supporters of 
whaling. They for example base their arguments on that killing fish is morally 
OK, that it is morally OK that other animals are treated worse than whales (for 
example pigs in the meat industry), that intelligence should be measured by 
our particular human style of intelligence, that there is an ethically relevant 
difference between humans and whales, that whales must have some kind of 
value for humans in order for them to be valued at all, and that is is impossible 
to live in accordance with an ecocentric ethics. However, just because 
someone defines a burden of proof, it is not necessary to accept it. Why is it 
that the burden of proof always lies with those who do not wish to limit 
intrinsic value and moral consideration to human beings? Why should 
anthropocentrism be accepted as the universal “truth”? Martin Gorke does not 
accept that those who wish to include non-humans in the moral circle have to 
justify it. Instead, he choses to reverse the burden of proof. Now, those who 
argue that non-humans should not be included have a burden of proof – now 
they need to explain why humans are the only ones who should be given moral 
consideration, and not the other way around.  
The person who assumes that invertebrates and plants are direct objects of moral 
consideration is not the one who must convincingly demonstrate that his or her 
perspective is legitimate. This is the responsibility of the person who feels that 
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the prima facie universal character of morality must be restricted to entities with 
consciousness (Gorke 2003:284).  
In this particular case regarding whaling, even conscious beings are left 
outside the moral circle. Curry agrees with Gorke that the burden of proof 
needs to be reversed, and also argues from the starting point that all of nature 
has intrinsic value: 
This book therefore does not advocate ethics by 'extension' from human being 
throughout other animals (mostly those lucky enough to resemble people in 
some way that is valued) to, perhaps, and only after much agonizing, trees. 
Rather, I start from the belief, or perception, that nature – which certainly 
includes humanity – is the ultimate source of all value (Curry 2011:2).  
When reversing the burden of proof, the starting point is that every natural 
entity on the planet has intrinsic value, including minke whales, the fish who 
both minke whales and humans like to eat, the animals who are “less 
intelligent” and treated worse than minke whales, as well as the ocean minke 
whales live in as an ecosystem. It does also include, as Curry emphasises, 
human beings. And this is an important point – now we have to discuss how 
we as humans can live rich and meaningful lives in accordance with this. 
Ecological ethics as a field offers us a platform for doing exactly this.  
 
Even though it may seem as though I have accepted that the burden of proof 
lies with those who question the practice of whaling for non-anthropocentric 
reasons, and those who think that more-than-human nature has intrinsic value 
- carrying the burden with me through part two of this thesis by answering and 
discussing the arguments of “Vågehvalen – valgets kval” and others who 
define this burden of proof - this is not the case. I share Gorke's and Curry's 
belief that those who only ascribe intrinsic value to human beings, or for 
example to certain animals, certain plants, or to species but not the individuals 
they consists of or the ecosystem they belong to, need to prove why this is the 
case. However, ecological ethics is not a widely practiced discipline, and as 
we have seen in the debate about whaling in Norway, a public discussion 
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consciously using ecological ethics as a platform is rare to find. It may be 
difficult to make a case for a reversal of the burden of proof when ecological 
ethics as a discipline is not yet familiar, or as in the debate about whaling not 
even “accepted”. For this reason this thesis has addressed some of the “proofs” 
defined by the supporters of whaling, including the claimed legitimisation 
problem, and discussed them in order to illustrate that they may not be proofs 
at all. After ecological ethics has been presented as a field and the readers 
have become familiar with the discussion about anthropocentrism, intrinsic 
value, knowledge, etc. and how this can be applied to discussions about more-
than-human nature, then one can speak of reversing this burden of proof. This 
thesis is meant as an introduction for doing so – and it has shown that one 
does not need to accept anthropocentrism as the right way to perceive the 
world, nor that a burden of proof lies with those who argue for a less human-
centered ethical framework.  
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Concluding Thoughts 
 
Patrick Curry states that “all societies have values and ethics; and far from 
being optional considerations, they are among the strongest factors that 
determine our actual behaviour on the ground” (Curry 2011:9). Virtually all 
humans acknowledge the importance of ethics – it is an integrated part of our 
everyday lives and fundamental for how people choose to behave in relation to 
each other. However, it is important to remember that other human beings are 
not the only ones humans live in relation to. The necessity of ecological ethics 
is not only made evident by the fact that humans are affecting the rest of 
nature on a global scale (causing scientists to consider that we have entered 
the new geological era of Anthropocene), but also by the fact that we live in 
relationship with other natural entities. And as Curry has emphasised: 
“relationships between subjects entail ethics” (Curry 2011:3). Another 
important point is that we not only live in a relationship with more-than-
human nature – we are also a part of it. As David Abram argues, it does not 
make sense to separate ourselves from the rest of nature, which we are 
sustained by, both physically and mentally. In fact, we can say that our human 
bodies are our small bodies, while the rest of Earth is our larger body (Abram 
2014). When acknowledging these human/nature relationships we should also 
ackowledge that more-than-human nature should be included in our ethics.  
Ethics that is only concerned with humans encourages our powerful 
susceptibility to limited sympathies, short-terminism and greed, rather than 
checking it. It also denies any responsibility for the effects of our behaviour on 
the millions of other species and many million living individuals with whom we 
share the Earth: not exactly an ethically impressive position (Curry 2011:3). 
 
This thesis has briefly outlined the general field of ethics, before presenting 
ecological ethics and creating an overview of some of the different views 
within this area. These presentations have varied from those who argue that 
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nature can be protected without being given intrinsic value, like Bryan G. 
Norton, those who give intrinsic value to other animals, like Peter Singer, and 
those who also give intrinsic value to plants, like Gary Varner, to those who 
find intrinsic value in all of nature, like Aldo Leopold, David Abram and Arne 
Næss. What all these different views have in common is their 
acknowledgement of the importance of asking deeper questions concerning 
humans' relationship with more-than-human nature, for example by discussing 
who has intrinsic value and what this implies, or what we really need to live 
fulfilled lives. While the central question in ethics is how one should live and 
act in relation to other humans, the central question in ecological ethics is how 
one should live and act in relation with more-than-human nature. However, it 
is an important point to make that ecological ethics does not replace human 
ethics. The point, as Curry says, is rather that “adding something new will 
enable an ethical behaviour that a more anthropocentric ethics cannot, on its 
own, accomplish” (Curry 2011:7) 
 
Even though, for reasons mentioned above, ecological ethics should be an 
important part of debates regarding more-than-human nature, this is often not 
the case. As we have seen in particular, this is not the case in the Norwegian 
public debate concerning whaling. Following a brief chapter about Norwegian 
whaling and its history, and another brief chapter about minke whales (which 
is the only species of whale that is commercially hunted in Norway), I have 
presented the book “Vågehvalen – valgets kval”. This book has formed the 
main basis for discussions in the rest of the thesis. It was published with 
support from the Norwegian government in 1993, at the same time as it was 
decided that Norway would resume whaling after a seven year break - despite 
the IWC moratorium. The book was, according to its editors, meant as a form 
of “public education” about whaling. But, as Siri Martinsen has argued (and as 
has become clear in the course of the discussion), it is more accurate to say 
that the book functioned as a part of the government's agenda to create a 
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“whaling nation” and to gather support from the Norwegian population before 
resuming whaling - despite clear opposition from both the national and the 
international community (Martinsen 2013:108) The three main arguments 
presented for continued whaling, mentioned repeatedly throughout the book, 
and still used today, are as follows: More whales equal less fish for the fishing 
industry, the killing methods used in whaling are not less humane than the 
methods used in the killing of many other kinds of animals, and Norwegian 
whaling is a sustainable way of managing our ocean resources. These may 
seem to be sound and reasonable arguments for many at first sight. However, 
this thesis has has challenged them, by consciously using ecological ethics as a 
platform for expanding the discussion and by asking, in Næss' words, deeper 
questions. When doing so, these arguments no longer appear as sound and 
satisfactory. Instead of arguing who suffers the most – whales or pigs? or 
whether the estimated numbers of the North-East Atlantic minke whale 
populations is correct, this re-framing of the discussion has shifted the focus to 
questions such as: Is it morally OK to kill whales so that we can kill even 
more fish than we already do? Is it morally OK to kill whales because many 
other animals are treated worse? Is it morally OK to kill whales because they 
do not belong to an endangered species, and to speak of whales and the ocean 
as “our” “resources”? And is it morally OK to kill other animals at all?  
 
Many interesting ethical debates can spring forth from these questions (some, 
but not all, of which I have taken up here). However, it seems as though the 
authors of the book had a certain interest in tying down ethical discussions like 
these, by stating that ethics is not really important in this debate, and that those 
who use it only do so in the lack of any “real” arguments. Furthermore, it is 
claimed that those who use ecological ethics consciously when discussing 
have a legitimisation problem. Those who do use ecological ethics consciously 
when arguing are still today often not taken seriously, and sometimes mocked 
for using feelings instead of - or in addition to - rational knowledge when 
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arguing. But as we have seen, feelings and subjective experiences are an 
important way of obtaining knowledge, and they also form what make up our 
“objective” world. Therefore it does not make sense to draw such definitive 
distinctions between feelings and (rational) knowledge. Even if it did: Why 
should it be accepted to argue on the basis of feelings such as empathy and 
compassion when debating issues regarding humans, but not when discussing 
issues involving non-humans? It should also be emphasised that those who 
argue for continued whaling are themselves using feelings when arguing and 
present certain kinds of ethical views – even though, possibly, unconsciously. 
When the book, in the ethics chapter and briefly some other places, does 
discuss whaling consciously in the light of ecological ethics, it does not offer a 
thorough discussion. As we have seen, the pro-whaling side attitudes 
presented in the book concludes that an insufficient answer is “the price one 
has to pay” for finding an ethically relevant difference between whales and 
humans, and that it is unproblematic to kill whales but not certain groups of 
humans. The very brief discussion concerning intrinsic value in more-than-
human nature concludes that it is impossible to live in accordance with an 
ecocentric ethics, arriving at such a strong conclusion without having 
discussed any of the ecocentric views presented in part one of this thesis. 
Instead of recognising more inclusive ethical positions as valuable and 
significant voices in the whaling debate, and instead of promoting the larger 
discursive platform that is ecological ethics, it seems as though “Vågehvalen – 
valgets kval” – and those whose interests it represents – actually tries to tie 
down the debate, so that certain unspoken premises are never questioned: 
Anthropocentrism is without any alternatives. The individuals, species and 
ecosystems who constitute the more-than-human nature are “resources”, and 
they are “ours” to “manage”. We can only speculate as to why so many of the 
important points mentioned in this thesis are either left out entirely or 
misrepresented so strongly in the book, and why this is still the case in public 
debates about whaling or other issues regarding more-than-human nature 
today. Is it because of a certain anxiety of the consequences of acknowledging 
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such deeper (and more difficult) questions? Or is it simply because they have 
not been properly introduced to ecological ethics, and for this reason have a 
too narrow ethical imagination to perceive the world in a non-anthropocentric 
way?  
 
If the first suggestion is the case – a fear of consequences - then David 
Rothenberg should be quoted one more time: “One should never limit the 
bounds of the problem just to make an easier solution acceptable” (Rothenberg 
in Næss 1989:12). It is easier to prevent an ethical discussion about whaling 
than to face the unknown (and perhaps complicated and inconvenient) 
consequences of an open and informed discussion. Because, when opening up 
to a thorough ethical discussion about whaling, then an end to whaling may 
not be the only consequence. It is possible that more people, for instance, 
would acknowledge the arbitrariness of not giving whales the right to live 
when all groups of humans have this right. If this discussion started it is 
perceivable that it might lead to other sentient animals being included in the 
debate as well. Perhaps other parts of nature too? If whaling was the only 
industry at stake by opening up a discussion of the issue in the light of 
ecological ethics, then perhaps the government and other who are pro-whaling 
would not be so reluctant to discuss it. As we have seen, whaling is a small 
industry, involving few people, and its economic gain is assumed to be lower 
than its costs. Putting a stop to whaling would for these reasons not have any 
large economic consequences for the Norwegian society as a whole. In fact, it 
can be argued that whale watching is most likely more profitable than whaling 
itself. Still, the government continues to defend whaling, and, as seen, to 
spend millions of NOK each year to keep the industry going. Ola Borten Moe 
is concerned that if we start to discuss one issue ethically (in his case fur 
farming, but the argument is transferable), then the further discussion may be 
difficult to contain. He is afraid of what might be the consequences for his 
chicken farm if fur farming is discussed ethically and, as a possible 
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consequence, ended. In the same way, the pro-whalers may fear what ethically 
discussing whaling implies because of the possible consequences. When 
people change their perception of the world from an anthropocentric to a less 
human-centred ethical position, they also need to change the way they live and 
act in relation with the rest of nature some way or another, perhaps in ways 
that are not viewed as convenient – both for themselves individually, but also 
for the government and others who profit from exploiting more-than-human 
nature. Containing an ethical discussion about anything more-than-human is 
probably the easiest solution. But is it acceptable? 
 
If the latter suggestion is the case - if the authors of “Vågehvalen – valgets 
kval” and other people sharing their anthropocentric views do not use 
ecological ethics consciously when discussing more-than-human nature 
because they have a too narrow ethical imagination or if any other approach is 
unfamiliar to them - then this thesis may be a good starting point. Not only 
does it present several different ethical views within ecological ethics, making 
the readers familiar with some of the non-anthropocentric options, it also 
attempts to show that there is no need to be “intimidated” by this approach - 
which, for instance, the government and others sharing their pro-whaling 
views, seem to be. I have emphasised that ecological ethics does not give a 
universal answer to how we should live in accordance with a non-
anthropocentric ethics, but that there are a variety of different views and that 
everyone can develop their own. Opening up to a discussion of more-than-
human nature based on ecological ethics does not mean that one has to end up 
with an ecocentric standpoint, or even that one has to be against whaling. As 
we have seen, it is, for instance, possible to argue for prioritising ecosystems 
over individuals – and after all, hunting a few whales may be more 
environmentally friendly than many of the other ways food is produced today. 
The point is, rather, that we should challenge the dominant anthropocentric 
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world-view, and discuss how to best live in relationship with the rest of nature 
– not how we as humans most effectively can exploit it.  
 
This thesis has used the Norwegian public debate on whaling as an example to 
illustrate the absence of a thorough ethical discussion in debates concerning 
non-humans. Issues regarding non-human animals, such as whales, can be a 
good place to start, as other sentient animals are those who are usually first 
included when the moral circle expands, and because most people already 
have given intrinsic value to some non-human animals, such as their pets. 
However, when using whaling as a starting point, it soon becomes evident 
that, when arguing based on ecological ethics, the discussion cannot end with 
whales but is constantly expanding. In addition to whales, both as individuals 
and as a species, this debate directly also concerns fish, as well as the ocean as 
an ecosystem. In addition, it is nearly impossible, when starting to discuss the 
questions mentioned above, to see the debate concerning whales as an isolated 
one, for example from a debate about other sentient animals, our perception of 
resources, or what is the most ethical way of eating. I thus share Borten Moe's 
predictions that when opening up to an ethical discussion on one issue 
regarding non-humans, like fur farming or whaling, the discussion may not 
end with this. However, I do not share his solution - trying to contain it.  
 
As we have seen, the point that the goal is not to present an ethics that 
everyone should follow is an important part of Næss' deep ecology. Rather, 
the goal both Næss and I are trying to reach, the way I see it, is to encourage 
others to ask deeper questions and to use ecological ethics consciously as a 
tool for thinking through their profound views of the nature/human 
relationship, and also how one should best live in accordance with these views 
- while still living meaningful and fulfilled human lives. This thesis may be a 
starting point for doing so, as it highlights the importance of ecological ethics, 
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and (hopefully) challenges people to test the bounds of their predominantly 
ethical imagination. Perhaps it even encourages some to share their thoughts 
in public debates regarding more-than-human nature, such as whaling? 
Whether or not participating in public debates; after reading this thesis, those 
who wish to continue exploring the field of ecological ethics know that when 
doing so, they do not have to accept that the burden of proof lies with those 
who give intrinsic value to more-than-human nature. On the contrary, it is 
those with an anthropocentric perception of the world who need to explain 
why human beings are the only ones who should be included in the moral 
circle.  
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